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THE EU AND ITS MEMBER STATES IN WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT:  
A ‘Competence Model’, or A Case Apart, for Managing International Responsibility? 
 
Gracia Marín Durán1 
 
(DRAFT, available on SSRN) 
 
Forthcoming in M. Cremona, A. Thies and R. Wessel (eds.), The EU and International Dispute 
Settlement (Hart Publishing, 2016). 
 
 
1) INTRODUCTION 
 
The aim of this chapter is to examine and assess the participation of the European Union (EU) 
and its Member States (MS) in the dispute settlement system of the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO), with a focus on one legally and politically important question: how their unique 
position as full WTO members has affected their respective responsibility for the performance 
of WTO obligations. As is the case for any other ‘mixed’ agreement, this joint EU/MS 
membership of the WTO inevitably prompts the question of ‘who is responsible’ towards third 
parties for breaches of WTO law. The question of the EU’s international responsibility vis-à-
vis that of its Member States has been the subject of intense study in the past years, 2 partly due 
to the increasingly prominent role of the Union on the international scene but also the work of 
the International Law Commission (ILC) on the Articles on the Responsibility of International 
Organisations (ARIO).3 And yet within this broader debate, the WTO is often presented in the 
academic literature as providing both an ‘exceptional’ and ‘exemplary’ case-study.  
 
Not only is the WTO one of the rare international fora in which the EU can fully participate 
as a party in dispute settlement proceedings,4 but the Union –perhaps not surprisingly as one 
of the world’s leading trade powers– has actually been one of the dominant players in the WTO 
dispute settlement system: out of the total 499 disputes that have been brought for resolution 
to the WTO since 1995, the EU (alone) has participated in 316 of them.5 Therefore, in the 
context of the WTO dispute settlement system, the question of EU/MS international 
responsibility is not only of theoretical significance, but also highly relevant in practice. 
Moreover, the active participation of the EU in the WTO dispute settlement system has been 
praised as constituting an example of its international actorness and leadership: in fact, the 
Union has been eager to come forward as single litigant and to assume sole responsibility in 
WTO disputes, even for alleged breaches by its Member States. Against this background, it has 
been argued that WTO dispute settlement practice shows how the duty of cooperation (Article 
                                                        
1 Lecturer in International Economic Law, University of Edinburgh School of Law. A first draft of the paper was 
presented at the Joint Workshop organised by the European University Institute, the ESIL Interest Group on 
‘The EU as a Global Actor’ and the Centre for the Law of the EU External Relations (CLEER) on ‘The EU and 
International Dispute Settlement’, 19-20 February 2015. I am most grateful to Bruno de Witte, Andres Delgado 
Casteleiro, Piet Eeckhout, Lothar Ehring and Mikko Huttunen for their useful comments on previous drafts and 
insightful discussions on the topic. Opinions and errors remain my own.  
2 See e.g., E. Evans and P. Koutrakos (eds.), The International Responsibility of the European Union – European and 
International Perspectives (Hart, 2013); and further references in section 2 below. 
3 Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations, annexed to UNGA Res 66/100, UN Doc 
A/Res/66/100, 27 February 2012 [hereinafter, ARIO]. 
4 See C. Hillion and R. Wessel, ‘The European Union and International Dispute Settlement: Mapping Principles 
and Conditions’ in Forthcoming in M. Cremona, A. Thies and R. Wessel (eds.), The EU and International Dispute 
Settlement (Hart Publishing, 2016). 
5 See WTO, ‘Disputes by Country/Territory’, at: 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_by_country_e.htm, last visited on 29 October 2015.  
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4(3) TEU) has allowed the EU to speak with one unified voice, with that voice being the 
European Commission as porte-parole for the Union.6  
 
While generally upholding this prevailing view that the EU’s participation in the WTO dispute 
settlement system has been a ‘success story’, this chapter will offer a more nuanced assessment 
of the Union’s eagerness to assume lead responsibility for breaches of WTO law, in terms of 
both the degree of third-party acceptance and the relative impact of EU own rules. After outlining the 
theoretical questions of international responsibility stemming from the parallel EU/MS 
membership of the WTO (section 2), the chapter will proceed to analyse how this issue has 
been tackled in the practice of WTO dispute settlement. Drawing upon this in-depth analysis 
of practice, two main arguments will be advanced. First, the extent to which the EU’s assertion 
of exclusive participation and responsibility has been accepted by other WTO members and 
dispute settlement organs ought to be qualified, particularly in light of more recent, post-
Lisbon, WTO disputes (section 3). Second, the approach to EU/MS international responsibility 
we have witnessed in the WTO dispute settlement system has not just been determined by the 
EU’s internal rules –i.e., a pure ‘competence model’, whereby the exclusive (external) 
competence of the EU for virtually all WTO matters will implicate its exclusive responsibility 
in all instances.7 Rather, the specificity of the WTO dispute settlement system has exercised 
considerable influence on whether and how such internal rules are relevant to the determination 
of EU (sole or joint) responsibility for breaches of WTO law, and most significantly the WTO 
rules on remedies which embody the very purpose of assigning responsibility for an 
internationally wrongful act in this specific treaty context. Accordingly, it is suggested that this 
‘competence/remedy’ model for managing EU/MS international responsibility in the WTO, 
which combines both internal and external legal factors, may remain a case apart, unique to that 
dispute settlement regime (section 4). 
 
2) EU/MS JOINT MEMBERSHIP IN WTO – QUESTIONS OF 
RESPONSIBILITY IN THEORY 
 
2.1 WTO Agreement as a ‘mixed agreement’ 
 
As is well-known, the (umbrella) Agreement establishing the World Trade Organisation (or 
WTO Agreement)8 was jointly concluded by the EU and its Member States following the 
                                                        
6 See e.g., A. Delgado Casteleiro and J. Larik, ‘The ‘Odd Couple’: Responsibility of the EU at the WTO’ in E. 
Evans and P. Koutrakos (eds.), The International Responsibility of the European Union – European and International 
Perspectives (Hart, 2013), at 252 and 254-255; P. Eeckhout,‘The EU and its Member States in the WTO – Issues of 
Responsibility’ in L. Bartels and F. Ortino (eds), Regional Trade Agreements and the WTO Legal System (Oxford 
University Press, 2006), at 6-7. That being said, EU Member States have of course continued to exert considerable 
influence over the conduct of WTO litigation through internal institutional structures (notably, the Council and 
the Trade Policy Committee; see Articles 207(3) and 218(9) TFEU), and worked closely with the European 
Commission in preparing the ‘Union’s defence’: see P.J. Kuijper, ‘International Responsibility for EU Mixed 
Agreements’ in C Hillion and P Koutrakos (eds), Mixed Agreements Revisited: The EU and Its Member States in the World 
(Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2010), at 224. 
7 This ‘competence model’, with specific reference to the WTO dispute settlement system, is proposed in P.J. 
Kuijper and E. Paasivirta, ‘ EU International Responsibility and its Attribution: From the Inside Looking Out’ in 
E. Evans and P. Koutrakos (eds.), The International Responsibility of the European Union – European and International 
Perspectives (Hart, 2013), at 54-63, and further discussed in section 4.1 below. 
8  Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 15 April 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 
[hereinafter, WTO Agreement], which serves as an umbrella agreement for: (i) 13 multilateral agreements on trade 
in goods (Annex 1A); (ii) General Agreement on Trade in Services (Annex 1B); Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (Annex 1C); Understanding on the Rules and Procedures Governing the 
Settlement of Disputes (Annex 2); Trade Policy Review Mechanism (Annex 3); and several plurilateral agreements 
(Annex 4).  
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famous Opinion 1/94,9 where the EU Court of Justice ruled that the Union10 had exclusive 
competence to conclude only the multilateral agreements on trade in goods (Annex 1A), 
whereas such external competence was shared with the Member States in relation to the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).11 This is reflected in Article XI:1 WTO Agreement, 
which refers to the EU and its Member States as full ‘original members’ in their own right.12 
Like for any other so-called ‘mixed’ agreement, this joint EU/MS membership of WTO 
inevitably prompts the question as to ‘who is responsible’ towards third parties in situations of 
non-performance. However, the WTO Agreement is somehow unusual when compared to 
other multilateral ‘mixed’ agreements, in that it does not contain any ‘Declaration of 
Competences’,13 and thus there is no indication as to which part of the WTO Agreement (and 
its covered agreements) binds the Union and which the Member States. In other words, there 
is no express delimitation of their respective responsibility in relation to the performance of 
WTO obligations.14  
 
Against this silence in the WTO Agreement, the general rules of international responsibility as 
codified by the International Law Commission15 provide that the existence of an internationally 
wrongful act entailing international responsibility depends on the twin conditions of breach of 
an international obligation and attribution of conduct.16 Applying this to our case-study raises, 
in turn, two questions: (i) how to apportion international obligations as between the EU and 
                                                        
9 Opinion 1/94 (re WTO Agreement) [1994] ECR I-5267. Note that, while the Court’s exclusive jurisdiction (under 
now Article 344 TFEU) is increasingly presented as an obstacle to the EU’s participation in international dispute 
settlement, it was seemingly not a concern for the Court when accepting the joint EU/MS membership of the 
WTO in Opinion 1/94, even though there is no explicit limitation to the exclusive jurisdiction of the WTO dispute 
settlement organs (Article 23 DSU). Thus, a dispute between the EU Member States, or between the EU and the 
Member States, could theoretically be brought before the WTO dispute settlement organs (e.g., one Member State 
challenging the WTO legality of another Member States’ measure implementing an EU Directive). However, this 
has never been done, nor been seriously contemplated, in WTO dispute settlement practice since 1995 (see section 
3.1 below) and will not therefore be discussed here. For further discussion, comparing with the more restrictive 
approach of the Court in Opinion 2/13, see P. Eeckhout, ‘Opinion 2/13 on EU Accession to the ECHR and 
Judicial Dialogue – Autonomy or Autarky?’ Jean Monnet Working Paper 01/2015, available at: 
http://jeanmonnetprogram.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/JMWP-01-Eeckhout1.pdf.    
10 For the benefit of simplification, this chapter will refer to the European Union only, even though Opinion 1/94 
concerned the then ‘European Community’, and indeed it is the ‘European Communities’ that formally became a 
member of the WTO (see n 12 below).  
11For a detailed discussion, see inter alia J.H. Bourgeois, ‘The EC in the WTO and Advisory Opinion 1/94: an 
Echternach Procession’ (1995) 32 Common Market Law Review 763; A. Burnside, ‘The Scope of the Common 
Commercial Policy Post Opinion 1/94: Clouds and Silver Linings’ in A. Dashwood and C. Hillion (eds.), The 
General Law of EC External Relations (Sweet&Maxwell, 2000); N. Emiliou, ‘The Death of Exclusive Competences?’ 
(1996) 21 European Law Review 2 (1996) 294. 
12 Article XI:1 WTO Agreement, reads: “The contracting parties to GATT 1947 as of the date of entry into force 
of this Agreement, and the European Communities, which accept this Agreement and the Multilateral Trade 
Agreements and for which Schedules of Concessions and Commitments are annexed to GATT 1994 and for 
which Schedules of Specific Commitments are annexed to GATS shall become original Members of the WTO.” 
(emphasis added). 
13 For a critical review, see A. Delgado Casteleiro, ‘EU Declarations of Competence to Multilateral Agreements: 
A Useful Reference Base?’ (2012) 17(4) European Foreign Affairs Review 491; J. Heliskoski, ‘EU Declarations of 
Competence and International Responsibility’ in E. Evans and P. Koutrakos (eds.), The International Responsibility of 
the European Union – European and International Perspectives (Hart, 2013).  
14 Cf with United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 3, Annex IX, 
Articles 5 and 6, whereby the extent of the respective powers of an international organisation and its member 
States (as notified under the Convention) determines the extent of their respective responsibilities for breaches of 
the Convention.  
15 Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, annexed to UNGA Res 56/83, UN Doc 
A/RES/56/83, 12 December 2001 [hereinafter, ARS]; and ARIO (n 3 above). 
16 Article 2 ARS; Article 4 ARIO. 
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its Member States under a ‘mixed’ treaty such as the WTO Agreement; and (ii) when may 
conduct17 of the EU Member States which violates WTO law be attributed to the Union (and 
vice-versa). A sticky point in the discussions leading up to the drafting of the ARIO was, 
however, whether the ‘rules of the organisation’ –and in particular, the internal delimitation of 
powers– should play a role in determining the respective international responsibility of an 
international organisation and its members. While it is not the purpose of this chapter to paint 
a complete portrait of this theoretical debate,18 the main contrasting positions will be briefly 
outlined below as a backdrop to the subsequent analysis of practice in the WTO dispute 
settlement system.  
 
2.2 Question of Apportionment of Obligations 
 
As they currently stand, the general rules of international responsibility do not specifically 
address the question of determining the respective obligations of an international organisation 
and its members in cases where both are parties to an international treaty, such as the WTO 
Agreement for the EU and its Member States.19 In this respect, the European Commission’s 
position, as elaborated in its submissions on the ARIO to the ILC, has been that the question 
of apportionment of international obligations should be “entirely determined by the rules of 
the organisation, since these rules define the tasks and powers of the organisation which 
possesses its own international legal personality, vis-à-vis those of the member States.” 20 
Moreover, the EU takes the view that apportionment of obligations “is really the primary 
question” and should be clearly distinguished from the secondary question of attribution of 
conduct.21  
 
Applying this line of reasoning to the case of the WTO, this would mean looking at EU rules 
on the division of external (i.e., treaty-making) powers in order to determine whether a particular 
WTO obligation has been entered into by the Union or its Member States. However, given the 
dynamic and blurry delineation of external competences, it is hardly realistic to expect WTO 
dispute settlement organs to engage with such complex questions of EU law, nor does it seem 
desirable from the perspective of safeguarding the ‘autonomy’ of the EU legal order. 22 
Arguably, this issue has now become less complicated with the entry into force of the Lisbon 
Treaty,23 by virtue of which the Union has acquired exclusive external competence for quasi all 
                                                        
17 In this paper, the term ‘conduct’ is interchangeably used with the term ‘measure’, which in the context of the 
WTO dispute settlement system equally means ‘any act or omission attributable to a WTO Member’: US – 
Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review, Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS244/AB/R, adopted 9 January 2004, 
para 81. 
18  See further, J. d’ Aspremont, ‘A European Law of International Responsibility? The Articles on the 
Responsibility of International Organisations and the EU’ in V. Kosta, N. Skoutaris and V. Tzevelekos (eds.), The 
EU Accession to the ECHR (Hart, 2014); F. Hoffmeister, ‘Litigating against the European Union and Its Member 
States – Who Responds under the ICL’s Draft Articles on International Responsibility of International 
Organizations?’ (2010) 21(3) European Journal of International Law 723; E. Paasivirta and P. J. Kuijper, ‘Does One 
Size Fit All? The European Community and the Responsibility of International Organizations’ (2005) XVVI 
Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 169; S. Talmon, ‘Responsibility of International Organisations: Does the 
European Community require Special Treatment?’ in M. Ragazzi (ed.), International Responsibility Today: Essays in 
memory of Oscar Schachter (Matinus Nijhoff, 2005).  
19 See Article 11 ARIO; Articles 12-13 ARA. 
20 ILC, ‘Responsibility of International Organisations – Comments and Observations received from International 
Organisations’, Doc A/CN.4/545, dated 25 July 2004 [hereinafter ARIO Comments 2004], at 26 (para. 2). This 
seems also the view taken by Advocate General Mischo in Case C – 13/00 Commission v Ireland [2002] ECR I-2923, 
para. 30 of the Opinion; as well as by Paasivirta and Kuijper (2005), at 216.   
21ARIO Comments (2004), at 26 (para. 3). 
22 For a similar view, see Eeckhout (2006), at 9.  
23 Article 3(1)(e) TFEU. 
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matters presently regulated by WTO law.24 Following the Commission’s view, this would imply 
that, as the sole bearer of WTO obligations in a post-Lisbon setting, only the EU is capable of 
incurring international responsibility in the WTO. If this is so, there would be no need to 
consider the question of attribution: for the Commission, it is impossible that a wrongful act 
can still be attributed to the EU Member States, once it has been established they are no longer 
carriers of the relevant WTO obligations.25 Even if one accepts that this proposition is true as 
a matter of EU (competence) law, it is not equally valid under public international law.26  
 
From an international law perspective, so long as both the EU and its Member States remain 
parties to the WTO Agreement (and its covered agreements), the presumption is that they are 
each bound by all obligations therein27 and may not invoke internal rules as justification for 
non-performance,28 unless it is otherwise agreed in the treaty or in situations covered by Article 
46 VCLTIO. However, as already mentioned, there is no ‘Declaration of Competences’ or any 
other textual basis in the WTO Agreement for apportioning obligations and responsibility as 
between the EU and its Member States.29 In addition, it is doubtful that Article 46 VCLTIO 
could be invoked in this case:30 given the ambiguity as to the division of competences between 
                                                        
24 Except for transport services (Article 207(5) TFEU). With regards to the TRIPS Agreement, see Case C-414/11 
Daiichi Sankyo and Sanofi-Aventis Deutschland, judgement of 18 July 2013 (not yet reported), paras. 45-61, where 
the Court upheld the Commission’s view that, following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the TRIPS 
Agreement as a whole now falls within the EU’s exclusive external competence under the CCP, even though the 
specific subject of patentability at issue (Article 27 TRIPS) is covered by shared competence in the field of the 
internal market (Articles 114 and 118 TFEU). See generally, P. Eeckhout, EU External Relations Law (Oxford 
University Press, 2nd edition, 2011), chapter 2; and F. Hoffmeister, ‘The European Union’s Common Commercial 
Policy a year after Lisbon—Sea Change or Business as Usual?’ in P. Koutrakos (ed), The European Union’s External 
Relations a Year after Lisbon (CLEER Working Paper 2011/3), at 83-84.  
25 ARIO Comments (2004), at 26, para. 4-5, applying this reasoning to customs matters.   
26 See on this point, Advisory Opinion of Advocate General Tesauro in Case C – 53/96 Hermes International v. FHT 
Marketing [1998] ECR I-3603, para. 14: “This is how matters stand on the Community side but it must not be 
forgotten that both the Community and the Member States signed all the WTO agreements and are therefore 
contracting parties vis-à-vis contracting non-member States. And while it is true that the approval of those 
agreements on behalf of the Community is restricted to ‘matters within its competence’, it is also true that the 
Final Act and the WTO Agreement contain no provisions on competence and the Community and its Member 
States are cited as original members of equal standing. In these circumstances, it should be recognised that the 
Member States and the Community constitute, vis-à-vis contracting non-member States, a single contracting party 
or at least contracting parties bearing equal responsibility in the event of failure to implement the agreement. This 
clearly means that, in that event, the division of competence is a purely internal matter.” 
27 This flows from the principle of pacta sunt servanda in Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
between States and International Organisations or between International Organisations, 21 March 1986 (not yet 
in force) [hereinafter, VCLTIO].  
28 Article 27 VCLTIO. 
29 The only caveat to be noted in this regard is the GATS Schedule of Specific Commitments: the EU Schedule 
currently in force only covers the 12 Member States in 1994, while those that have later acceded to the EU have 
their own Schedules. See, WTO, ‘European Communities and Their Member States – Schedule of Specific 
Commitments’ (GATS/SC/31), dated 15 April 1994; and for the Services Schedules of the other 16 EU Member 
States: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/serv_commitments_e.htm.  
Following these successive enlargements, the EU has entered into negotiations on compensatory adjustment with 
other WTO members pursuant to Article V:5 GATS. However, the resulting Consolidated Schedule of Specific 
Commitments of the EU and its Member States has not yet entered into force: see WTO, ‘Communication from 
the European Communities and its Member States – Draft Consolidated GATS Schedule’ (S/C/W/273), dated 9 
October 2006. Accordingly, at the time of writing, the 16 Member States that acceded to the EU after 1994 are 
still bound by their individual Schedules of Specific Commitments, which has implications not only for their market 
access obligations (Article XVI GATS), but also other obligations in the GATS that are applicable only to the 
extent that a WTO member has undertaken specific commitments in its Schedule (notably, Article XVII GATS 
on national treatment, as well as e.g., Article VI:1 and VI:5 GATS on domestic regulation).  
30 Article 46(2) VCLTIO provides: “An international organization may not invoke the fact that its consent to be 
bound by a treaty has been expressed in violation of the rules of the organization regarding competence to 
conclude treaties as invalidating its consent unless that violation was manifest and concerned a rule of fundamental 
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the EU and its Member States prevailing at the time when the WTO Agreement was concluded, 
a violation of the rules of the organisation could not have been “manifest” (i.e., objectively 
evident) to third parties.31 Consequently, the majority of the academic literature adopts the view 
that the EU and its Member States are jointly bound by all provisions of WTO law.32 But does 
this mean there would be joint responsibility of the EU and its Member States for breaches of 
WTO law in each and every case? That is not a foregone conclusion: being bound by the same 
WTO obligation is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for the joint responsibility of the 
EU and its Member States.33 In the logic of the system of international responsibility as codified 
by the ILC, breach of an obligation needs to be supplemented by attribution, and therefore the 
key question is whether the WTO-infringing conduct is attributable to the EU and/or its 
Member States.  
 
2.3 Question of Attribution of Conduct 
 
Unlike for the issue of apportionment, the general rules of international responsibility deal 
specifically with the attribution of conduct to an international organisation.34 Article 6 ARIO 
provides that conduct of an organ or agent of an international organisation shall be attributed 
to it, while Article 7 ARIO extends such an attribution to the organisation for the conduct of 
an organ of a State in cases where it is ‘placed at the disposal of’ the organisation and if the 
latter exercises ‘effective control’ over such conduct. However, the European Commission and 
some scholars have argued that these attribution rules are not flexible enough to accommodate 
the distinctive traits of the Union’s constitutional structure and functioning.35  
 
This concern is not entirely misplaced, as applying the ARIO rules on attribution to the EU/MS 
relationship would limit the situations in which the Union incurs (sole) responsibility for 
breaches of WTO law.36 Due to the multilevel and decentralised implementation of most areas 
                                                        
importance.” Article 46(3) VCLTIO further states: “A violation is manifest if it would be objectively evident to any 
State or any international organization conducting itself in the matter in accordance with the normal practice of 
States and, where appropriate, of international organizations and in good faith.” (emphasis added).  
31 For a similar view, see Eeckhout (2006), at 3 noting that, due to the sequence of events, some WTO members 
may in fact have signed and approved the WTO Agreement before Opinion 1/94 was delivered; and E. Steinberger, 
‘The WTO Treaty as a Mixed Agreement: Problems with the EC’s and the Member States’ Membership of the 
WTO’ (2006) 17(4) European Journal of International Law 837, at 842-848 and 856-857. For a different view, see M 
Björklund, ‘Responsibility of the EC and the Member States for Mixed Agreements – Should Non-Member Parties 
Care? (2001) 70(30) Nordic Journal of International Law 373, at 388-402. For a criticism, see L. Bartels, Human Rights 
Conditionality in the EU’s International Agreements (OUP, 2005), at 153.  
32  See inter alia, M. Cremona, ‘External Relations of the EU and the Member States: Competence, Mixed 
Agreements, International Responsibility and Effects of International Law, EUI Working Papers Law No 2006/22; 
G. Gaja, ‘The European Community’s Rights and Obligations under Mixed Agreements’ in D. O’Keeffe and H.G. 
Schermers (eds.), Mixed Agreements (Kluwer, 1983); E. Neframi, ‘International Responsibility of the European 
Community and of Member States under Mixed Agreements’ in E. Cannizzaro (ed), The European Union as an Actor 
in International Relations (Kluwer, 2002); J. Heliskoski, ‘Joint Competence of the European Community and its 
Member States and the Dispute Settlement Practice of the World Trade Organization’ (1999–2000) 2 Cambridge 
Yearbook of European Legal Studies 80; A. Rosas, ‘The European Union and International Dispute Settlement” in L. 
Boisson de Chazournes, C. Romano and R. Mackenzie (eds.) International Organisations and International Dispute 
Settlement: Trends and Prospects (Brill, 2002).  
33 A. Nollkaemper, ‘Joint Responsibility between the EU and Member States for Non-Performance of Obligations 
under Multilateral Environmental Agreements’ in E. Morgera (ed.) The External Environmental Policy of the European 
Union: EU and International Perspectives (Cambridge University Press, 2013), at 330.  
34 Chapter II ARIO. 
35 See e.g., Kuijper and Paasivirta (2013), at 69.  
36 Note, however, that Chapter IV ARIO provides for a number of situations in which the responsibility of an 
international organization may arise in connection with the act of a State, presumably without attribution, including 
where the international organization “aids or assist a State in the commission of an internationally wrongful act 
(Article 14) or “circumvents one of its international obligations” through decisions or authorizations addressed to 
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of EU law (i.e., so-called ‘executive federalism’),37 EU organs directly implement only a limited 
(even if important) segment of the common commercial policy (CCP) –i.e., trade defence 
measures,38 which are clearly attributable to the Union via Article 6 ARIO. For other areas of 
the CCP, the Union is largely dependent on its Member States to execute EU law, and thus 
national authorities are likely to be more visible to third parties as the factual actor of an alleged 
WTO breach. Customs administration constitutes the most obvious example of this special 
character of the Union’s ‘executive federalism’: even though this is a core EU exclusive 
competence, there is no EU customs service but 28 national customs administrations that 
implement (directly applicable) EU customs legislation.  
 
As the European Commission aptly noted in its comments to the ILC, “[t]he fact that the 
implementation of [EU] law, even in areas of its exclusive competence, is normally carried out 
by the member States and their authorities, poses the question as to … when the [EU] as such 
is responsible not only for acts committed by its organs, but also for actions of the member 
States and their authorities.”39 Yet, it is commonly accepted that Article 7 DARIO does not 
provide an appropriate basis for attributing acts of the Member States when implementing EU 
law to the Union: its ‘normative control’40 over Member States’ conduct is generally considered 
to fall short of the ‘effective control’ test in that provision.41 Alternatively, the EU would need 
to constantly rely on the exception provided for in Article 9 ARIO so as to ‘acknowledge and 
adopt’ conduct of its Member States as its own.42  
 
That being so, it is understandable to some extent that the European Commission pressed for 
a special rule of attribution of internationally wrongful acts during the ILC codification 
process,43 which was initially opposed by the Special Rapporteur Gaja and eventually led to the 
introduction of Article 64 ARIO on lex specialis, leaving open the possibility that the general 
rules on responsibility may be set aside in the case of the EU and its Member States.44 As seen 
                                                        
its members (Article 17), which could arguably be applicable to the EU/MS relationship. However, unlike Articles 
6-7 ARIO where responsibility through attribution seems to be a ‘black-or-white’ question (i.e., either the 
organization or the State), Chapter IV ARIO appears to create an additional layer of responsibility for the 
organization without prejudice to that of the State (Article 19), leading therefore to joint responsibility. See further, 
Hoffmeister (2010), at 727 and Nollkaemper (2013), at 323-324. 
37 On this so-called ‘executive federalism’, see R. Schütze, ‘From Rome to Lisbon: ‘Executive Federalism’ in the 
(new) European Union’ (2010) 47 Common Market Law Review 1385. 
38 Article 291(2) TFEU; see Hoffmeister (2010), at 740.  
39 ARIO Comments (2004), at 29 (para. 3).  
40 Hoffmeister (2010), at 742, suggests that there are two conditions for determining ‘normative control’ of the 
Union for the purpose of international responsibility: (i) EU law governs the substantive legality of Member State 
action; (ii) this is ultimately controlled by the EU judiciary. This approach is borrowed by Kuijper and Paasivirta 
(2013), at 55; and Nollkaemper (2013), at 335. 
41  ILC, ‘Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organisations, with Commentaries’ (2011), 
Commentary to Article 7, reflecting it was mainly intended to codify rules on the responsibility of international 
organizations for military operations using forces of its members. See also, Hoffmeister (2010), at 726-727; 
Nollkaemper (2013), at 331. Kuijper and Paasivirta (2005), at 192, are further critical of the suggestion that, in 
cases where Member States’ authorities implement EU law, such organs are ‘placed at the disposal’ of the EU: this 
“grates the ears of the average [EU] lawyer, since it is inherent in the [EU] legal order, and in particular in the 
primacy of [EU] law, that Member States’ legislative, administrative and judicial organs carry out and implement 
[EU] law.” 
42 Article 9 ARIO provides: “Conduct which is not attributable to an international organization under articles 6 to 
8 shall nevertheless be considered an act of that organization under international law if and to the extent that the 
organization acknowledges and adopts the conduct in question as its own.” For a criticism, see Paasivirta and P.J. 
Kuijper (2005), at 217. 
43 For a more detailed account, see Hoffmeister (2010), at 728-729.  
44 Article 64 ARIO provides: “These draft articles do not apply where and to the extent that the conditions for 
the existence of an internationally wrongful act or the content or implementation of the international responsibility 
of an international organization … are governed by special rules of international law. Such special rules of 
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earlier for the question of apportionment, the EU equally considers that attribution of conduct 
should reflect the internal division of competences. Drawing on its statements in the WTO 
case EC – Computer Equipment (1998) discussed below,45 the Commission posits that acts of 
Member States’ authorities when implementing EU law in a field of EU exclusive (external) 
competence should be attributed to the Union itself.46 According to Hoffmeister, this would 
logically follow from Article 2(1) TFEU given that, in areas of exclusive EU (external) 
competence such as the CCP, “only the Union may legislate and adopt legally binding acts, the 
Member States being able to do so themselves only if so empowered by the Union or for the 
implementation of Union acts.” 47  Indeed, a number of scholars have suggested that, if 
necessary, Article 64 ARIO should be invoked to defend this competence-based approach to 
attribution and international responsibility.48  
 
The problem of attribution of Member States’ conduct to the Union should be further refined, 
though. In support of its position, the Commission often relies on the example of customs 
legislation, which is a purely external matter and extensively harmonised though EU Regulations 
that are binding in their entirety and directly applicable in the Member States.49 Put differently, 
EU customs legislation clearly orders what the Member States have to do and they have no 
choice but to implement it. In these particular circumstances where Member States’ conduct is 
strictly confined to implementing EU law, it is not difficult to accept that national customs 
authorities act de facto as organs of the Union. Yet, this perfect example of EU executive 
federalism is not necessarily applicable to all areas covered by WTO law. Part of the reason for 
this is that the exclusive EU external competence under the CCP is not fully matched by an 
exclusive competence to regulate internally. As Eeckhout rightly suggests, the taxation of 
products provides a case in point: externally, such taxation is subject to Article III GATT falling 
under exclusive EU competence, whereas internally Member States retain competence for 
certain forms of taxation that are not harmonised or even regulated at EU level.50 When 
Member States impose such taxes through independent national legislation, can they still be 
regarded as functionally acting as organs of the Union?  
 
Similar doubts may arise in other ‘grey areas’ where, even though Member States do act within 
the scope of EU law, the degree of the Union’s normative control over their conduct is more 
limited than in the context of implementing EU Regulations. One example is State aid, which 
is subject to WTO disciplines on subsidies: unlike classical executive federalism, EU Member 
States are not here acting to execute a certain harmonised EU rule, but rather individually 
providing aid within certain boundaries set by EU law.51 In addition, the link between Member 
                                                        
international law may be contained in the rules of the organization applicable to the relations between an international 
organization and its members.” (emphasis added). The commentary thereto explicitly records that there is a variety 
of opinions concerning the possible existence of a special rule with respect to the attribution to the EU of conduct 
of the Member States when they implement binding acts of the Union. For a more detailed account, see 
Hoffmeister (2010), at 728-729.  
45 See section 3.2 below for further discussion.  
46 ARIO Comments (2004), at 29 (para. 5).  
47 Articles 2(1) and 3(1)(e) TFEU; Hoffmeister (2010), at 743. 
48 Kuijper and E. Paasivirta (2013), at 69; and Hoffmeister (2010), at 745-746.  
49 Article 288 TFEU. 
50Eeckhout (2006), at 10. 
51 Articles 107 (2) and (3) TFEU stipulate the conditions under which State aid, otherwise prohibited under Article 
107(1) TFEU, may be considered “compatible with the internal market”. Article 108 TFEU empowers the 
Commission to assess and control the compatibility of State aid granted by the Member States with the internal 
market. In particular, Article 108(3) TFEU requires Member States, as a general rule, to notify new State aid 
measures to the Commission and they may only put these measures into effect after obtaining the Commission’s 
approval. However, there are some exceptions to this requirement of prior notification/approval (e.g., State aid 
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States’ conduct and EU law may not always be straightforward when they act to implement EU 
Directives, as these are only binding with respect to the aim(s) pursued but leave some 
discretion as to the form and method of implementation,52 and thus a varied application is likely 
to result across EU Member States. Moreover, particularly in the fields of consumer and 
environmental protection, it is not uncommon for the EU to adopt so-called minimum 
harmonisation Directives setting out standards that national legislations must meet but may 
exceed if a given Member State so desires:53 one significant example in light of the on-going 
WTO dispute Australia – Tobacco Plain Packaging54 are the UK and Irish (draft) legislations on 
standardised packaging of tobacco products,55 which go beyond the requirements of the EU 
Tobacco Products Directive.56 The question thus arises as to whether such a restricted EU 
normative authority over Member States’ conduct may be enough to attribute it to the Union 
for the purposes of international responsibility.57  
 
Against this background, the next section turns to analyse how the WTO dispute settlement 
system has tackled the joint membership of the EU and its Member States. To what extent 
have these theoretical questions of responsibility been a controversial issue in practice? Or 
conversely, have third parties in the WTO de facto accepted the EU’s assertion of exclusive 
responsibility for breaches of WTO law, even by its Member States?  
 
3) EU/MS INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY IN THE WTO – A 
CONTROVERSIAL ISSUE IN PRACTICE? 
 
3.1. The Broad Picture  
 
As reflected in Table 1 below, the ‘mixed’ EU/MS membership of the WTO has been hardly 
visible in dispute settlement practice. 
 
 
Table 1 – EU/MS Practice in WTO Dispute Settlement (1995 – 2015) 
 
 Complainant Respondent Third Party Total 
                                                        
covered by the so-called ‘Block Exemption’ Regulations and de minimis aid). For an overview, see P. Craig and G. 
de Bùrca, EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials (Oxford University Press, 5th edition, 2011), 1087-1106. 
52 Article 288 TFEU. 
53 This is in line with Articles 169(4) and 193 TFEU. 
54 Australia — Certain Measures Concerning Trademarks, Geographical Indications and Other Plain Packaging Requirements 
Applicable to Tobacco Products and Packaging, Procedural Arrangement between Australia and Ukraine, Honduras, the 
Dominican Republic, Cuba and Indonesia, WT/DS434/12, WT/DS435/17, WT/DS441/16, WT/DS458/15, 
WT/DS467/16, dated 28 April 2014. 
55 WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade, ‘Notification by the United Kingdom’ (G/TBT/N/GBR/24) 
dated 3 September 2014; ‘Notification by Ireland’ (G/TBT/N/IRL/1) dated 17 June 2014. 
56 Directive 2014/40/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on the approximation of the laws, 
regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning the manufacture, presentation and sale 
of tobacco and related products and repealing Directive 2001/37/EC [2014] L127/1. Article 24(2) specifically 
allows that Member States may introduce further requirements in relation to the standardisation of the packaging 
of tobacco products, provided they are justified on grounds of public health, are proportionate and are not a 
means of arbitrary discrimination or disguised restriction on trade between Member States. 
57 This seems to be the position taken by Hoffmeister (2010), at 746, suggesting the following special rule of 
attribution: “The conduct of a State that executes the law or acts under the normative control of a regional 
economic integration organization may be considered an act of that organization under international law, taking 
account of the nature of the organization’s external competence and its international obligations in the field where 
the conduct occurred.” (emphasis added).  
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EU  
(individual claims) 
95 6858 153 316 
EU/MS  
(joint/parallel claims) 
- 1459 - 14 
MS 
(individual claims) 
160 1061 - 11 
 
At a first glance, the EU undoubtedly stands out as one of the most active users of the WTO 
dispute settlement system: out of the total 499 disputes that have been brought for resolution 
to the WTO since 1995,62 the Union (alone) has participated either as a complainant (95), a 
respondent (68) or third party (153) in 316 of them. By way of comparison, the United States 
(US), as the other key player in the WTO dispute settlement system, has participated in a total 
of 360 WTO cases.63 In contrast, the EU Member States (individually) have played a minimal 
and passive role in WTO dispute settlement:64 to date, none has initiated a dispute against a 
third country65 or intervened as a third party in any WTO case, while only some have been 
occasionally targeted as individual respondents by another WTO member (i.e., the US in all 10 
cases).66    
                                                        
58 This number seeks to capture the number of WTO disputes in which the EU sole responsibility was invoked 
by the third parties concerned. It thus reflects the total ‘request for consultations’ (i.e., this being the first step in 
WTO dispute settlement procedures; Article 4 DSU) addressed exclusively to the EU. Note, however, that in some 
of these cases, a ‘mutually agreed solution’ was reached by parties to the dispute, while a considerable number of 
other cases have been formally pending for years at consultations stage.  
59 This number seeks to capture the number of WTO disputes in which the ‘joint’ responsibility of the EU and its 
Member States was invoked by the third parties concerned. It thus reflects the total ‘request for consultations’ 
addressed to the EU jointly with one or more of its Member States (e.g., WT/DS375-377, European Communities and 
its Member States — Tariff Treatment of Certain Information Technology Products), and those addressed to the EU in parallel 
to claims on the same subject-matter addressed to MS (e.g., WT/DS62, EC – Customs Classification of Computer 
Equipment, in which the US also brought separate claims against Ireland (WT/DS68) and the UK (WT/DS67)). 
60 See n 65 below 
61 This number reflects the total ‘request for consultations’ addressed only to individual EU Member States (see n 
66 below), even though the EU may have intervened as a party to negotiate a ‘mutually agreed solution’ to the 
dispute (see nn 84-85 below).  
62  See WTO, ‘Chronological List of Dispute Cases’, at: 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_status_e.htm, last visited 29 October 2015.  
63  See WTO, ‘Disputes by Country/Territory’, at: 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_by_country_e.htm, last visited 29 October 2015.  
64 The lack of active litigation by EU Member States in the WTO dispute settlement system may be due to purely 
political/institutional reasons, but may also be explained by legal constraints resulting from EU law, and in 
particular the duty of cooperation (Article 4(3) TEU): for a discussion, see Delgado Casteleiro and Larik (2013), 
at 251-252. 
65 To date, the only EU Member State to have initiated WTO dispute settlement procedures is Denmark, but in 
respect of the Faroe Island and against the EU: European Union — Measures on Atlanto-Scandian Herring, Request for 
Consultations by Denmark in respect of the Faroe Island, WT/DS469/1, dated 7 November 2013. On 21 August 
2014, the parties informed the Dispute Settlement Body that the matter raised in this dispute was settled: European 
Union — Measures on Atlanto-Scandian Herring, Joint Communication from Denmark in respect of the Faroe Island 
and the European Union, WT/DS469/3, dated 25 August 2014.  
66 Namely: Belgium (Belgium — Measures Affecting Commercial Telephone Directory Services, Request for Consultations 
by the United States, WT/DS80/1, dated 13 May 1997; Belgium — Certain Income Tax Measures Constituting Subsidies, 
Request for Consultations by the United States, WT/DS127/1, dated 11 May 1998; Belgium — Administration of 
Measures Establishing Customs Duties for Rice, Request for Consultations by the United States, WT/DS210/1, dated 
19 October 2000); Denmark (Denmark — Measures Affecting the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, Request for 
Consultations by the United States, WT/DS83/1, 21 May 1997); France (France — Certain Income Tax Measures 
Constituting Subsidies, Request for Consultations by the United States, WT/DS131/1, dated 11 May 1998); Greece 
(Greece — Certain Income Tax Measures Constituting Subsidies, Request for Consultations by the United States, 
WT/DS129/1, dated 11 May 1998); Ireland (Ireland — Certain Income Tax Measures Constituting Subsidies, Request 
for Consultations by the United States, WT/DS130/1, dated 11 May 1998); Netherlands (Netherlands — Certain 
Income Tax Measures Constituting Subsidies, Request for Consultations, WT/DS128/1, dated 11 May 1998); Portugal 
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However, for the purpose of our discussion, it appears pertinent to examine more in depth the 
statistics concerning passive litigation –i.e., EU/MS acting as a respondent jointly or 
individually– as an indicator of how the question of EU/MS international responsibility has 
been approached by third parties and dispute settlement organs in the WTO. In doing so, it 
seems also interesting to break down such statistics into the pre-Lisbon and post-Lisbon 
period67 as a means to gauging whether, and if so how, the internal transfer of exclusive 
competence to the EU for all CCP matters has affected the approach to EU/MS international 
responsibility in the practice of WTO dispute settlement.  
 
3.2. Pre-Lisbon Practice – Pragmatic Approach to EU (exclusive) Responsibility 
 
A glimpse at Table 2 below would seem to support the view that, “[i]n fact, the whole discussion 
on the [joint responsibility] of the EU and its Member States in the WTO is put aside in favour 
of the sole responsibility of the Union in the WTO dispute settlement system”,68 particularly 
during the pre-Lisbon period. 
 
Table 2 – EU/MS as Respondents in WTO Dispute Settlement (1995 – 2015)  
 
 Respondent Pre-Lisbon Respondent Post-Lisbon 
EU (individual claims) 54 14 
EU/MS  
(joint/separate claims) 
5 9 
MS (individual claims) 10 0 
 
Evidently, the vast majority of WTO disputes (54) during the pre-Lisbon period were brought 
against the EU alone. In all instances, the Union (through the European Commission) has been 
eager to come forward as lead litigant and to assume exclusive responsibility for all alleged 
breaches of WTO law, including in the field of the TRIPS agreement that still fell within 
EU/MS shared competence at that time.69 Yet, one should not be bewildered by this wide 
targeting of the EU as single respondent, given that most of these complaints concerned only 
                                                        
(Portugal — Patent Protection under the Industrial Property, Request for Consultations by the United States, 
WT/DS37/1, dated 6 May 1996) Sweden (Sweden — Measures Affecting the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, 
Request for Consultations by the United States, WT/DS86/1, dated 2 June 1997). 
67 The Treaty of Lisbon was signed on 13 December 2007 and entered into force on 1 December 2009. Thus, in 
Table 2, ‘pre-Lisbon’ period refers to all WTO disputes initiated between 1 January 1995 and 1 January 2008, 
whereas ‘post-Lisbon period’ to those initiated between 1 January 2008 and 1 March 2015. The underlying 
assumption made here is that, in these latter cases, the Lisbon-based change in the internal division of EU/MS 
external competences for trade matters could have influenced the approach to international responsibility at the 
consultations stage or/and in Panel/Appellate Body proceedings.  
68 Delgado Casteleiro and Larik (2013), at 238. 
69 Notably: European Communities — Protection of Trademarks and Geographical Indications for Agricultural Products and 
Foodstuffs, Report of the Panel, WT/DS174/R, adopted 20 April 2005, paras. 7.97-7.98 and 7.722-7.727, involving 
TRIPS claims against Council Regulation (EEC) No 2081/92 and related implementing and enforcement 
measures, and where the Panel accepted the EU’s explanation of “what amounts to its sui generis domestic 
constitutional arrangements that [EU] laws are generally not executed through authorities at [EU] level but rather 
through recourse to the authorities of its Member States which, in such a situation, act as de facto organs of the 
[EU] for which the EU would be responsible under WTO law and international law in general.” This allowed the 
Panel to refute the US allegation that there was an infringement of the most-favoured-nation treatment obligation 
in Article 4 TRIPS, when EU Member States are executing the Union-wide system on the protection of 
geographical indications as established by the challenged EU Regulation. However, this case did not directly 
address the question of EU/MS international responsibility, as the US raised violation claims against the EU only, 
and no specific measure by the EU Member States was identified.  
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legal acts of the EU institutions,70 which are clearly attributable to the Union pursuant to Article 
6(1) ARIO.71 Nonetheless, in some cases, claims directed against the EU alone have involved 
also measures of its Member States, not only when implementing EU law sensu stricto, but when 
acting under the normative umbrella of the EU in a broader sense. A well-known example is 
the EC – Biotech Products (2006) dispute, where the contested measures included national 
safeguard measures prohibiting the import and/or marketing of specific biotech products, 
which had been taken by six Member States in reliance on the possibility provided for in the 
relevant EU legislation.72 Even if the degree of EU normative control in respect of these 
safeguard measures was somehow restricted (i.e., to authorisation),73 the WTO panel accepted 
the EU standing as single respondent and bearing sole responsibility for these measures, based 
on two ‘pragmatic’ considerations:  
“It is important to note that even though the member State safeguard measures were 
introduced by the relevant member States and are applicable only in the territory of the 
member States concerned, the [EU] as a whole is the responding party in respect of the 
member State safeguard measures. This is a direct consequence of the fact that the 
Complaining Parties have directed their complaints against the [EU], and not individual [EU] 
member States. The [EU] never contested that, for the purposes of this dispute, the 
challenged member State measures are attributable to it under international law and hence can 
be considered [EU] measures …”74 
 
                                                        
70 With the exception of the following disputes: European Communities — Trade Description of Scallops, Notification 
of Mutually Agreed Solution from Canada and the European Union, WT/DS7/12, dated 19 July 1996 and 
European Communities — Trade Description of Scallops, Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution from Peru, Chile the 
European Union, WT/DS12/12, WT/DS14/11, dated 19 July 1996, concerning a French Order on the official 
names and permitted trade descriptions of scallops in France; European Communities — Measures Affecting Butter 
Products, Notification of a Mutually Agreed Solution from New Zealand and the European Union, WT/DS72/7, 
dated 18 November 1999, concerning decisions by the European Commission and the United Kingdom’s 
Customs and Excise Department excluding certain types of New Zealand’s butter from eligibility for its country-
specific tariff quota established in the EU’s Schedule; European Communities — Certain Measures Prohibiting the 
Importation and Marketing of Seal Products, Communication from Canada, WT/DS369/3, dated 3 December 2014, 
concerning certain measures taken by Belgium and the Netherlands regarding the importation, transportation, 
manufacturing, marketing and sale of seal products and withdrawn following repeal of such measures. In addition, 
see cases discussed (n 72, 75 and 76 below). 
71 It suffice to cite the well-known WT/DS26 and WT/DS48 European Communities — Measures Concerning Meat and 
Meat Products (Hormones) involving (inter alia) claims under GATT, SPS, TBT against Council Directive (EEC) No 
602/81, Council Directive (EEC) No 146/88 and Council Directive (EEC) No 299/88; WT/DS27 European 
Communities — Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, involving (inter alia) claims under the GATT, 
GATS and Import Licensing Agreement against Council Regulation (EEC) No 404/93; WT/DS265, WT/DS266 
and WT/283 European Communities — Export Subsidies on Sugar, involving claims under the Agriculture and SCM 
Agreements against Council Regulation (EC) No 1260/2001 and related measures; as well as various WTO cases 
concerning EU trade defence measures (e.g., WT/DS141 European Communities — Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports 
of Cotton-type Bed Linen from India, involving claims under the Anti-Dumping Agreement; and WT/DS326 and 
WT/DS328 European Communities — Definitive Safeguard Measures on Salmon, involving claims under the Agreement 
on Safeguards). 
72 European Communities — Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, Report of the Panel, 
WT/DS291/DS/292/DS293/R, adopted 21 November 2006 [hereinafter, EC – Biotech Products], paras. 2.1-2.5. 
73 See Article 23 of Directive (EC) No 2001/18 and Article 12 of Regulation (EC) No 258/97 permitting, under 
certain conditions, EU Member States to adopt safeguard measures in respect of biotech products that have 
obtained approval for EU-wide marketing. In such cases, the Member State concerned must inform other EU 
Member States and the Commission of the action it has taken and a decision on the safeguard measure must then 
be taken at EU level within a prescribed time period. However, it has been reported that the safeguard measures 
at issue in this dispute had not been approved by the EU, nor had the European Commission open infringement 
procedures against the Member States concerned, which in practice were arguably free from EU’s normative 
control: see, A. Delgado Casteleiro, The International Responsibility of the European Union: From Competence to Normative 
Control (PhD thesis, European University Institute, 2011), at 200. 
74 Panel Report in EC – Biotech Products (2006), para. 7.101 (emphasis added).  
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In support of this pragmatic approach, the Panel referred to the earlier EC – Asbestos (2001) 
case, where the EU was targeted as sole defendant –and potentially sole responsible if a breach 
of the WTO law had been established (quod non)– of the challenged French decree banning 
asbestos and asbestos-containing products, even though the link between this national measure 
and EU legislation was not readily obvious.75 Another less cited but also important case is EC 
– Commercial Vessels (2005) concerning the ‘grey area’ of state aid. Here, the challenged measures 
included national aid schemes adopted by five EU Member States pursuant to an EU 
Regulation (providing for a temporary defensive mechanism for the shipbuilding sector), which 
had been explicitly authorised by the European Commission.76 After formally noting that Korea 
had made the panel request with respect to the European Union only,77 the Panel accepted the 
EU’s sole responsibility for the national aid schemes, emphasising two key elements: (i) the EU 
Regulation and Commission’s decisions were the “legal authority” under which EU Member 
States provided aid; and (ii) in the event of a finding of WTO-inconsistency, the EU had 
declared to assume responsibility for “any actions that may be required to bring into conformity 
the measures at issue”, removing thereby the “legal basis for granting any further aid”.78 
 
Turning to the ten WTO disputes against individual Member States, these were all brought 
(perhaps non-coincidentally) by the United States and date back to the early years of the WTO 
dispute settlement system (1995-2000). Some of these cases concerned claims under the GATS 
and TRIPS, and to some extent may be genuinely motivated by the lack of legal clarity, which 
prevailed at that time following Opinion 1/94, as to the exact division of competences –and 
thus, respective obligations– between the EU and its Member States in these fields of WTO 
law.79 However, others involved claims in areas that were unequivocally held in Opinion 1/94 to 
fully fall under EU exclusive external competence (i.e., the GATT and the SCM Agreement),80 
and may well have been motivated by a strategic attempt to weaken European unity and 
leadership in the WTO. 81  In any event, no WTO panel has pronounced itself on the 
                                                        
75  European Communities — Measures Affecting Asbestos and Products Containing Asbestos, Report of the Panel, 
WT/DS/135/R, adopted (as modified) 5 April 2001 [hereinafter, EC – Asbestos], paras. 3.32-3.35. While the EU 
had adopted a series of Directives on the matter since 1980, it was only in May 1999 (i.e., 3 years after the adoption 
of the French decree) that it decided to introduce an EU-wide ban on all types asbestos (including chrysotile 
asbestos at issue) with effect from 1 January 2005.   
76 European Communities — Measures Affecting Trade in Commercial Vessels, Report of the Panel, WT/DS301/R, 
adopted 20 June 2005 [hereinafter, EC – Commercial Vessels], paras. 7.36 – 7.51. The five EU Member States 
concerned were Denmark, Germany, France, the Netherlands and Spain. 
77 Ibid., para. 7.33. 
78 Ibid., paras. 7.33 and 7.53, and footnote 156. The Panel found that, “[i]n light of these elements, we would find 
it sufficient, in the circumstances of this case, to address our recommendation to bring the measures at issue into 
conformity to the [EU].”  
79 With regards to GATS claims, see: Belgium — Measures Affecting Commercial Telephone Directory Services, Request for 
Consultations by the United States, WT/DS80/1, dated 13 May 1997. As to the TRIPS, see: Denmark — Measures 
Affecting the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, Request for Consultations by the United States, WT/DS83/1, 
21 May 1997; Portugal — Patent Protection under the Industrial Property, Request for Consultations by the United States, 
WT/DS37/1, dated 6 May 1996; Sweden — Measures Affecting the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, Request for 
Consultations by the United States, WT/DS86/1, dated 2 June 1997. 
80 With respect to the GATT, see: Belgium — Administration of Measures Establishing Customs Duties for Rice, Request 
for Consultations by the United States, WT/DS210/1, dated 19 October 2000; With respect to the SCM 
Agreement, see: Belgium — Certain Income Tax Measures Constituting Subsidies, Request for Consultations by the 
United States, WT/DS127/1, dated 11 May 1998; France — Certain Income Tax Measures Constituting Subsidies, 
Request for Consultations by the United States, WT/DS131/1, dated 11 May 1998; Greece — Certain Income Tax 
Measures Constituting Subsidies, Request for Consultations by the United States, WT/DS129/1, dated 11 May 1998; 
Ireland — Certain Income Tax Measures Constituting Subsidies, Request for Consultations by the United States, 
WT/DS130/1, dated 11 May 1998; Netherlands — Certain Income Tax Measures Constituting Subsidies, Request for 
Consultations, WT/DS128/1, dated 11 May 1998.  
81 On this point, see S. Billiet, ‘The EC and WTO Dispute Settlement: Initiation of Trade Disputes by the EC’ 
(2005) 10 European Foreign Affairs Review 197, at 199.  
 14 
responsibility of EU Member States in these disputes, as six of them have been formally 
pending for years at consultations stage, 82 while in the other four a ‘mutually agreed solution’ 
was reached. Nevertheless, it is significant that in all but one83 of the cases resulting in a 
‘mutually agreed solution’, this was achieved with the EU intervening as a 
negotiating/responding party, not only for matters falling under its exclusive external 
competence,84 but also for issues revolving around the application of the TRIPS agreement 
where the extent of its competence was not entirely clear in this pre-Lisbon setting.85  
 
Most significant for our purposes, only in a few cases (5) have third parties formally invoked 
the joint responsibility of the EU and its Member States for alleged breaches of WTO law, by 
targeting them together (1) or by directing parallel claims on the same subject-matter to each 
of them separately (4).86 EC – Computer Equipment (1998)87 was the first case in which the joint 
EU/MS membership of the WTO caused controversy as to who was responsible in panel 
proceedings. The case concerned the tariff treatment of certain computer equipment, which 
the US claimed was in breach of the tariff concessions contained in the EU Schedule under 
Article II:1 GATT. Thus, it typically illustrates the kind of responsibility question that may arise 
in the context of ‘classical’ EU executive federalism –i.e., who is responsible for acts of Member 
States custom authorities in situations where they functionally act as organs of the Union? 
Unsurprisingly, the EU sought to assert its exclusive responsibility for any GATT infringement, 
based on its understanding that apportionment of obligations and attribution of conduct in the 
context of international responsibility should follow the delimitation of competences under EU 
law.88 In particular, the EU stressed that it was an “original member of the WTO in its own 
right” and that the tariff concessions “were bound in the GATT 1994 […] exclusively at the 
level of the [EU] and not at the level of individual member States.”89 Positioning itself as the 
only bearer of the GATT obligations in question, the EU declared its readiness to assume the 
                                                        
82 This is the case of the five WTO disputes (at n 80 above) concerning claims under the SCM Agreement, as well 
as that involving GATS claims (at n 79 above).  
83 The exception being: Portugal — Patent Protection under the Industrial Property Act, Notification of a Mutually-Agreed 
Solution from the United States and Portugal, WT/DS37/2, dated 8 October 1996, following a Portuguese Decree 
Law to conform with the term of patent protection required by the TRIPS Agreement.  
84 Notably, Belgium — Administration of Measures Establishing Customs Duties for Rice, Request for Consultations by the 
United States, WT/DS210/6, Notification of a Mutually Agreed Solution from the United States and the 
European Union, dated 2 January 2002. 
85Denmark — Measures Affecting the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, Notification of a Mutually Agreed Solution 
from the United States, the European Union and Denmark, WT/DS83/2, dated 13 June 2001; and Sweden — 
Measures Affecting the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, Notification of a Mutually Agreed Solution from the 
United States, the European Union and Sweden, WT/DS86/2, dated 11 December 1998, both following 
amendments in the respective national laws to provide for provisional measures inaudita altera parte in civil 
proceedings involving intellectual property rights. 
86 In addition to the EC – Computer Equipment (1998) dispute discussed here, the other three cases in which parallel 
claims were directed against the EU and its Member States separately have resulted in a ‘mutually agreed solution’ 
or been formally pending at consultations stage for years: (i) France — Measures Relating to the Development of a Flight 
Management System, Request for Consultations by the United States, WT/DS173/1, dated 31 May 1999; and 
European Communities — Measures Relating to the Development of a Flight Management System, Request for Consultations 
by the United States, WT/DS172/1, dated 31 May 1999, concerning GATT and SCM claims; (ii) Ireland — 
Measures Affecting the Grant of Copyright and Neighbouring Rights and European Communities — Measures Affecting the Grant 
of Copyright and Neighbouring Rights, Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution from United States, the European 
Union and Ireland, WT/DS82/3, WT/DS115/3, dated 13 September 2002; (iii) Greece — Enforcement of Intellectual 
Property Rights for Motion Pictures and Television Programs and European Communities — Enforcement of Intellectual 
Property Rights for Motion Pictures and Television Programs, Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution from the United 
States, the European Union and Greece, WT/DS124/2, WT/DS125/2, dated 26 March 2001.  
87 European Communities — Customs Classification of Certain Computer Equipment, Report of the Panel, WT/DS62/R, 
WT/DS67/R, WT/DS68/R, adopted (as modified) 22 June 1998 [hereinafter, EC – Computer Equipment).  
88 See section 2 above. 
89Panel Report in EC – Computer Equipment (1998), para. 4.10.  
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“entire responsibility for all measures in the area of tariff concessions”, 90 whether the measure 
complained about had been taken at EU level or at the level of the Member States. Significantly, 
the Union went further to support its full responsibility by linking the internal division of 
competences with the question of who can remedy the alleged wrongs: “it was exclusively 
competent for the subject matter concerned and thus the only entity in a position to repair the possible 
breach”91 –i.e., the only entity capable of ensuring the necessary restitution under WTO dispute 
settlement rules.92 
 
The US, on the other hand, submitted that both the EU and two of its Member States were 
responsible for the allegedly wrongful tariff treatment, arguing that Ireland and the UK were 
“independent members” of the WTO and equally bound by the EU Schedule under the 
GATT.93 For the US, the internal transfer of powers for tariff matters from the Member States 
to the EU was irrelevant externally, and did not result in “fewer rights and obligations being 
allotted to the Member States” under WTO law.94 Furthermore, the US took the view that the 
conduct of the Irish and UK customs administrations was attributable to those two States, 
emphasising that they were told during consultations with the EU that it “could not control 
the classification practices of member State customs authorities.” 95  The Panel, however, 
avoided addressing explicitly the US request to clarify the responsibility of the respective 
defendants and instead put forward compromise language that could satisfy both parties: “since 
the [European Union], Ireland and the United Kingdom are all bound by their tariff 
commitments under Schedule LXXX, our examination will focus, in the first instance, on 
whether customs authorities in the [European Union], including those located in Ireland and the 
United Kingdom, have or have not deviated from the obligations assumed under that 
Schedule.”96 On the one hand, the formula ‘customs authorities in the European Union’ could 
be read as endorsing the EU’s proposition that Member States customs authorities act 
functionally as EU organs when implementing EU law,97 and thus responsibility for their 
conduct should be solely attributed to the EU.98 On the other hand, the Panel sided with the 
US in that the relevant EU Schedule was equally binding on both the EU and its Member 
States,99 presumably implying all bear international responsibility for any breaches thereof, even 
                                                        
90 Oral Pleading of the European Communities to the Panel in EC – Computer Equipment (1998), 12 June 1997, 
para. 6. 
91 ILC, ‘Responsibility of International Organizations: Comments and Observations Received from International 
Organizations’, Sixty-third Session, Doc A/CN.4/637, dated 14 February 2011, at 24 (emphasis added), where the 
EU clarified that it was not simply adopting Member States conduct as its own (as per Article 9 ARIO). 
92 On this point, see further section 4.1 below. 
93 Panel Report in EC – Computer Equipment (1998), para. 4.13. 
94 Ibid., para. 4.14. 
95 Ibid., para. 4.12. Originally, the US tried to establish separate parallel WTO panels against the EU and the two 
Member States, but an agreement was reached between the parties to have one panel considering all claims (paras 
1.1-1.11).  
96 Ibid., para. 8.16.  
97 This federal-type agency argument was further advanced by the EU and accepted by the WTO panel in European 
Communities — Selected Customs Matters, Report of the Panel, WT/DS315/R, adopted (as modified) 11 December 
2006 [EC – Selected Customs Matters], paras. 7547-7553. However, this case touched only indirectly upon the issue 
of EU/MS international responsibility, given that the US violation claims under Article X:3 GATT were only 
addressed against the EU, and not against the EU Member States themselves. This can be easily explained by the 
fact that the US was directly challenging the decentralised nature of the EU’s system of customs administration as 
being contrary to the uniformity and prompt dispute resolution requirements of Article X:3 GATT. Thus, the 
preliminary issue that was raised was whether the EU was able to discharge its obligations under Article X:3 GATT 
through the Member States, which the Panel found to be the case.  
98 For a similar view, see Hoffmeister (2010), at 732.  
99 This was also the position of the Panel in EC – Selected Customs Matters (2006), para. 7.548: “it would appear that 
the [EU] as well as its constituent member States concurrently bear the obligations contained in the WTO 
Agreements, including those contained in Article X:3(b) of the GATT 1994.” (emphasis added) 
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if this is an area of EU exclusive competence. Nevertheless, the Panel ultimately found that it 
was the Union alone to have “acted inconsistently with its obligations under Article II GATT” 
and addressed recommendations to the EU only.100 
 
The other borderline case of this pre-Lisbon101 period in which the joint responsibility of the 
EU/MS was invoked and addressed by a WTO panel was the famous EC and Certain Member 
States – Large Civil Aircraft (2011),102 which was initiated by the United States back in 2004 but 
this time directing claims against the EU and four of its Member States together (Germany, 
France, Spain and the UK). The US claimed they had all provided subsidies separately and in 
parallel to Airbus large civil aircraft103 in contravention of “their obligations” under the GATT 
and SCM Agreement. 104  Again not surprisingly from an EU law standpoint, the Union 
requested that the Panel determine, as a preliminary matter, that the EU was the “only proper 
respondent” in the dispute, stressing that it was not simply “representing” the Member States 
in the proceedings, but took “full responsibility” for their actions. 105  However, the EU’s 
argumentation was essentially limited to restating that the alleged GATT/SCM violations 
related to matters within its exclusive competence and for which it bears sole responsibility in 
the WTO,106 with no indication as to how it would ensure compliance with any potentially 
adverse Panel’s recommendations also by its Member States in this specific case.  
 
The Panel rejected the EU request endorsing instead the formal argument advanced by the US 
that consultations and panel requests had been made with respect to the four Member States 
“in addition” to the EU: “[e]ach of these five is, in its own right, a Member of the WTO, with 
all the rights and obligations pertaining to such membership, including the obligation to 
respond to claims made against it by another WTO Member.”107 For the Panel, the ‘rules of 
the organisation’ –i.e., the internal division of powers– were of no relevance for the purpose of 
apportioning WTO obligations and allocating responsibility for any possible breach thereof 
between the EU and its Member States. Notably, it reasoned that the fact that the four Member 
States had chosen not to directly defend their interests in the dispute by making oral and written 
submissions separate from those of the EU was “a matter entirely within their discretion” and 
subject to their obligations under EU law, but did “not affect their rights or status as respondent 
parties” under WTO law. 108  Taking this position a step forward, it held that: “whatever 
responsibility the [EU] bears for the actions of its member States does not diminish their rights and 
                                                        
100 Ibid., paras. 9.1-9.2 (emphasis added). The issue of who was the proper respondent on the EU/MS side was 
not raised again on appeal: see EC – Computer Equipment (1998), Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS62/AB/R, 
WT/DS67/AB/R, WT/DS68/AB/R, adopted 22 June 1998, para. 57. 
101 While the case was initiated in 2004, Panel and Appellate Body proceedings were only concluded in 2011.  
102 European Communities — Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, Report of the Panel, Report of the Panel, 
WT/DS316/R, adopted (as modified) 1 June 2011 [hereinafter, EC – Large Civil Aircraft]. 
103 The principal measure at issue were the so-called “Launch Aid” or “Member State Financing” (LA/MFS) 
arrangements, provided by France, Germany, Spain, and the United Kingdom to Airbus for the development of 
large civil aircraft (LCA). Other measures challenged were: (i) Loans provided through the European Investment 
Bank to Airbus for LCA design, development, and other purposes; (iii) infrastructure and infrastructure-related 
grants to Airbus provided by Member State authorities; (iv) the provision to Airbus of equity infusions, debt 
forgiveness, and grants through government-owned and government-controlled banks; (v) research and 
technological research funding to Airbus provided by the EU and the Member States.  
104 European Communities — Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, Request for Consultations by the United 
States, WT/DS316/1, dated 12 October 2004. 
105 Panel Report in EC – Large Civil Aircraft (2011), paras. 7.171, requesting that the term “certain Member States” 
be dropped from the name of the case.  
106 Ibid., para. 7.169 and 7.172. See also, European Communities — Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, First 
Written Submission by the European Communities, WT/DS316, dated 9 February 2007, p. 4 and 43, available at: 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/wtodispute/show.cfm?id=268&code=2#_eu-submissions.  
107 Ibid., para. 7.174. 
108 Ibid., para. 7.176. 
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obligations as WTO Members, but is rather an internal matter concerning the relations between the 
[EU] and its member States.”109 Following this line of reasoning, the Panel determined that both 
the EU and the four Member States had acted inconsistently with their WTO obligations and 
addressed recommendations accordingly –i.e., significantly, the first and only WTO ruling to 
date establishing such a joint responsibility.110  
 
3.3. Post-Lisbon Practice – Challenging EU ‘exclusive’ Responsibility? 
 
Against the backdrop of the pre-Lisbon practice just examined, it is readily apparent from Table 
2 that joint EU/MS membership of the WTO is becoming much more visible in dispute 
settlement practice post-Lisbon –even if this may be somehow counterintuitive from an EU 
law perspective with the Union having been granted exclusive external competence for all CCP 
matters. At the outset, two main observations can be made: first, complaints addressed jointly 
to the EU and one or more of its Member States (9) are no longer the exception but almost as 
common as complaints directed against the EU alone (14); and second, it is no longer just the 
US bringing such joint complaints, but also other active players in the WTO dispute settlement 
system (i.e., Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Japan and Russia). Out of the nine cases in which 
the joint responsibility of the EU and its Member States has been formally invoked, only one111 
has led to the adoption of a WTO panel report, while the others appear still at 
consultations/panel request stage.112 Therefore, it is too early to appraise the significance of 
this trend in WTO dispute settlement practice. Nonetheless, it is interesting to note that these 
                                                        
109 Ibid., para. 7.175. 
110 Ibid., para. 8.5. Note, however, that the European Union did not appeal the specific issue of the proper 
respondent, and thus the Appellate Body did not have a chance to rule on it in an authoritative manner: see, 
European Communities — Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, Notification of Appeal by the European 
Union, WT/DS316/12, dated 23 July 2010. Ultimately, the Appellate Body addressed its recommendations to the 
EU only: “[…] request the European Union to bring its measures, found in this Report, and in the Panel Report 
as modified by this Report, to be inconsistent with the SCM Agreement, into conformity with its obligations under 
that Agreement.” (emphasis added). However, it also upheld the Panel’s recommendations to “the Member 
granting each subsidy” for those findings that were not appealed. See EC – Large Civil Aircraft (2011), Report of 
the Appellate Body, WT/DS316/AB/R, adopted 1 June 2011, paras. 1416 and 1418. 
111 European Communities and its Member States — Tariff Treatment of Certain Information Technology Products, Report of 
the Panel, WT/DS375/R, WT/DS376/R, WT/DS377/R, adopted on 21 September 2010 [hereinafter, EC – IT 
Products]. 
112 European Union and a Member State — Seizure of Generic Drugs in Transit, Requests for Consultations by India, 
WT/DS408/1, dated 19 May 2010; and European Union and a Member State — Seizure of Generic Drugs in Transit, 
Request for Consultations by Brazil, WT/DS409/1, dated 19 May 2010, both concerning GATT and TRIPS 
claims against several EU regulations and Dutch measures for the seizure of consignments of generic drugs 
originating in India by customs authorities in the Netherlands for alleged infringement of patents while in transit 
to third-country destinations; European Union and a Member State — Certain Measures Concerning the Importation of 
Biodiesels, Request for the Establishment of a Panel by Argentina, WT/DS443/5, dated 7 December 2012, 
involving GATT and TRIMS claims against a Spanish Ministerial Order governing the allocation of biodiesel 
production volumes for computing compliance with mandatory biofuel targets and supposedly adopted pursuant 
to Directive (EC) No 2009/28; European Union and Certain Member States — Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable 
Energy Generation Sector, Request for Consultations by China, WT/DS452/1, dated 7 November 2012, regarding 
claims under GATT, SCM and TRIMS against Italian and Greek measures supposedly taken pursuant to Directive 
(EC) No 2009/28, and including domestic content restrictions in feed-in tariff programs; European Union and 
Certain Member States — Certain Measures on the Importation and Marketing of Biodiesel and Measures Supporting the Biodiesel 
Industry, Request for Consultations by Argentina, WT/DS459/1, dated 23 May 2013, concerning claims under 
GATT, TBT, SCM and TRIMs against Directive (EC) No 2009/28 and Directive (EC) No 2009/30 and related 
measures taken by several Member States, establishing sustainability criteria for biofuels and support schemes for 
the biodiesel sector; European Union and its Member States — Certain Measures Relating to the Energy Sector, Request for 
the Establishment of a Panel by Russia, WT/DS476/2, dated 28 May 2015, involving claims under the GATT 
and GATS against the so-called “Third Energy Package”, and in particular Directive (EC) No 2009/73 establishing 
common rules for the transmission, distribution, supply and storage of natural gas, as well as related EU legal 
instruments and implementing measures by the Member States. 
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cases concern claims under WTO covered agreements falling within the ‘old’ (e.g., GATT, 
TBT, SCM Agreements) and ‘new’ EU exclusive external competence (i.e., GATS and TRIPS) 
alike, and increasingly involve Member States measures taken in the framework of EU 
legislation in the field of energy and climate change policies.113  
 
At the time of writing, the issue of EU/MS joint responsibility has only been addressed by the 
WTO panel in the EC – IT Products (2010) dispute concerning the tariff treatment of certain 
information technology products, which the US, Japan and Chinese Taipei claimed was in 
breach of the EU’s and its Member States’ obligations under (inter alia) Articles II:1(a) and 
II:1(b) GATT as it did not respect their commitments to provide duty-free treatment for these 
products under the Information Technology Agreement (ITA).114 The complainants addressed 
the consultations and panel requests jointly to the EU and its Member States, on grounds that 
both the EU and its Member States played a role in the application of the duties concerned. 
The complainants submitted that, while the Union had promulgated the challenged measures, 
customs authorities of the Member States, in implementing these EU regulations, issued 
‘Binding Tariff Information’ decisions specifying the customs classification code and applied 
customs duties to the products at issue. They further argued that the “internal legal 
relationship” between the EU and its Member States “cannot diminish the rights of other WTO 
members”, including under the DSU to bring claims against the EU Member States as WTO 
members in their own right.115  
 
However, the EU notified the Panel that it would participate as sole respondent in the 
proceedings and bear sole responsibility for any GATT breach. As in the EC – Computer 
Equipment (1998) dispute discussed above, the EU’s assertion of exclusive responsibility was 
here supported by a combination of internal and WTO-based legal arguments. As could be 
expected, the Union reiterated its exclusive competence under EU law for all tariff matters, 
arguing that the role of national customs authorities was limited to applying measures 
previously enacted at EU level. But critically, it also stressed that this meant, from a WTO law 
perspective, that only the EU could take “remedial action” to implement the Panel’s 
recommendations to the extent a GATT violation were determined, and thus “addressing any 
recommendations to each [EU] Member State would serve no useful purpose.”116 In addition, 
the Union sought to assure the Panel that the EU Member States would be required, as a matter 
of EU law, to apply any such implementing measures taken at EU level.117 The Panel made its 
recommendations to the EU only, hiding behind a rather ‘formalistic’ argument (i.e., an “as 
                                                        
113 For an overview, see T. Perišin, ‘Pending EU Disputes in the WTO: Challenges to EU Energy Law and Policy’ 
(2014) 10 Croatian Yearbook of International Law 371. On the EU ‘Climate and Energy Package’, see inter alia K. 
Kulovesi, E. Morgera and M. Muñoz, ‘Environmental Integration and Multi-Faceted International Dimensions of 
EU Law: Unpacking the EU’s 2009 Climate and Energy Package’ (2011) 48 Common Market Law Review 829. On 
the EU ‘Third Energy Package’ establishing common rules for an internal market in natural gas and electricity, see 
inter alia R. Boscheck, ‘The EU’s Third Internal Energy Market Legislative Package: Victory of Politics over 
Economic Rationality? (2009) 32(4) World Competition 593; and A. Johnston and G. Block, EU Energy Law (Oxford 
University Press, 2012).  
114 European Communities and its Member States — Tariff Treatment of Certain Information Technology Products, Request for 
the Establishment of a Panel by the United States, Japan and the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, 
Kinmen and Matsu, WT/DS375/8, WT/DS376/8, WT/DS377/6, dated 19 August 2008, which also includes 
claims under Article X GATT (publication and administration of trade regulations) by the United States and 
Chinese Taipei with regards to one of the products at issue (set-top boxes which have a communication function).  
115 European Communities and its Member States — Tariff Treatment of Certain Information Technology Products, Report of 
the Panel, WT/DS375/R, WT/DS376/R, WT/DS377/R, adopted 21 September 2010 [hereinafter, EC – IT 
Products], para. 7.81. 
116 Ibid., para. 7.80. 
117 Ibid., para. 7.80. 
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such” challenge), but ultimately persuaded that EU sole responsibility will bring a satisfactory 
settlement of this specific dispute:  
 “[…] we note that the complainants have framed their claims as challenging the [EU] 
measures "as such" and have confirmed to the Panel that they are not making claims with 
respect to specific applications of those measures by national customs authorities of 
any member States. Under the circumstances, the Panel considers that it is not required 
to make, and does not make, findings with respect to member States' application of the 
[EU] measures that were challenged "as such" in this dispute. Moreover, we are of the 
view that findings with respect to the measures adopted by the [EU] will provide a 
positive solution to the dispute.”118 
 
3.4. A nuanced assessment of EU (exclusive) Responsibility  
 
Two general conclusions can be drawn from the preceding analysis of EU/MS participation in 
the WTO dispute settlement system. First, theoretical questions such as ‘who is responsible for 
what’ arising from the joint EU/MS membership of the WTO have seldom been a 
controversial issue in dispute settlement practice. In fact, the question of EU/MS responsibility 
has thus far been litigated and directly addressed only on three occasions in WTO panel 
proceedings (i.e., EC – Computer Equipment (1998), EC – IT Products (2010) and EC – Large Civil 
Aircraft (2011)). Second, in these few instances where EU/MS responsibility was contentious, 
what caused contention was the Union’s eagerness to be held responsible in lieu of its Member 
States, and not them seeking to hide behind each other so as to evade international 
responsibility altogether. 119 Put differently, concerns over ‘accountability gaps’ have not really 
materialised in EU/MS practice within the WTO dispute settlement system. That being so, in 
which ways does this contribution seek to offer a more nuanced assessment of the EU’s leading 
role in WTO dispute settlement vis-à-vis that found in the literature?  
 
The first qualification made here concerns the degree to which the EU’s assertion of exclusive 
participation and responsibility has been accepted by other WTO members and scrutinised by 
WTO dispute settlement organs. In this regard, it has been argued that WTO dispute settlement 
practice “has gone a long way in the direction of attributing the acts of the Member States to 
EU, in particular when the Member States implement EU law or when their acts fall within the 
scope of EU legislation.”120 Such a conclusion would seem premature for a number of reasons. 
First, as we have seen, out of the total 68 WTO disputes in which the EU was targeted as sole 
respondent, only a few actually raised this sensitive question of attribution of conduct of the 
EU Member States to the Union. Since the vast majority of these cases involved complaints 
against EU measures only –rather than specific applications thereof by the Member States, 
there was no ambiguity that the Union bore sole responsibility for the alleged WTO-
inconsistency of such acts.121 Second, there were certainly some instances, particularly in the 
pre-Lisbon period, in which WTO members could have challenged but instead tacitly accepted 
EU exclusive responsibility for actions of the Member States taken under its (limited) normative 
authority –notably, EC – Asbestos (2001), EC – Commercial Vessels (2005) and EC – Biotech (2006). 
And it is also true that WTO panels have refrained from interfering with this course of action 
insofar as it was acquiesced to by WTO members. In this sense, the approach to EU/MS 
international responsibility in the WTO has been rightly described as being marked by both 
                                                        
118 Ibid., para. 8.2 (emphasis added).  
119 For a similar view, see Delgado Casteliero and Larik (2013), at 255; Eeckhout (2006), at 7. 
120 Kuijper and Paasivirta (2013), at 63; for a similar view, see Hoffmeister (2010), at 734 and 743; and Delgado 
Casteliero (2011), at 202.  
121 See nn 70 and 71 above.  
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assertiveness of the Union and pragmatism of all parties involved.122 However, this does not 
necessarily set a precedent for future disputes.123 Indeed, our examination of post-Lisbon 
practice reveals that WTO members have increasingly brought joint complaints when 
challenging measures adopted by the Member States within the normative sphere of EU law,124 
and it remains to be seen how these claims of joint EU/MS responsibility are dealt with if 
actually contested in WTO panel proceedings.125  
 
The second refinement made here pertains to the degree to which EU competence rules have 
been considered a relevant criterion for the purpose of allocating EU/MS international 
responsibility, in the three cases in which this proved a controversial issue before WTO panels. 
In this regard, it has been rightly noted that the approach of WTO panels has not been entirely 
consistent. 126  Understandingly from an international law perspective, WTO panels have 
consistently taken the position that internal transfers of powers do not affect the validity of 
WTO obligations for EU Member States: as full WTO members in their own right, they are 
bound by the entire WTO Agreement (and its covered agreements), in spite of whatever 
competence the Union may have for parts thereof as a matter of EU law.127 In other words, the 
‘rules of the organisation’ are largely irrelevant for the question of apportioning WTO 
obligations. Conversely, the available WTO jurisprudence is less clear on the extent to which 
the ‘rules of the organisation’ may be relevant to the question of attributing acts of the Member 
States to the Union. Whereas in cases of classical EU executive federalism (i.e., EC – Computer 
Equipment (1998) and EC – IT Products (2010)) WTO panels have ultimately accepted the 
Union’s sole responsibility for acts of its Member States when implementing EU (customs) 
legislation found in violation of the GATT, the Panel in EC – Large Civil Aircraft (2011)) drew 
a line in this regard and held both the EU and its Member States responsible for breaches of 
the SCM Agreement. These different findings cannot be easily explained in light of the internal 
allocation of competences, since both the GATT and the SCM Agreement have long been 
within the exclusive external competence of the Union. Yet, as will be argued next, this case 
law may appear less inconsistent if viewed from the perspective of a WTO panel and its very 
purpose in assigning responsibility for an internationally wrongful act in the specific treaty 
context of the WTO.  
 
4) EU/MS INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY IN THE WTO –  
A MODEL, OR A CASE APART? 
 
                                                        
122 Delgado Casteliero and Larik (2013), at 254; Eeckhout (2006), at 7. 
123 This point is further corroborated by the fact that there is no strict rule of stare decisis in WTO dispute settlement 
according to which previous rulings bind panels in subsequent cases, nor an Appellate Body decision on the matter 
that could be relied upon by future panels; see P. van den Bossche, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization 
(Cambridge University Press, 3rd edition, 2013), at 51-53. 
124 On this point, see further section 4.1 below with specific reference to: European Union and Certain Member States 
— Certain Measures on the Importation and Marketing of Biodiesel and Measures Supporting the Biodiesel Industry, Request for 
Consultations by Argentina, WT/DS459/1, dated 23 May 2013. 
125 In this context, note that the Panel in EC – IT Products (2010), para. 8.2, sounded a warning that, if necessary, 
it would have been prepared to address specific recommendations to the Member States, even if they are merely 
implementing EU legislation found WTO-inconsistent: “[EU] member states are WTO Members in their own 
right and … like all WTO Members, they are bound to act consistently with their WTO obligations. Thus, if one 
or more [EU] member States were found to have applied WTO inconsistent measures, be they enacted by the 
States themselves or by the [EU], it could be appropriate to find that the member States have acted inconsistently 
with their WTO obligations.” For a similar reading, see L. Bartels, ‘Procedural Aspects of Shared Responsibility 
in the WTO Dispute Settlement System’ (2013) 4(2) Journal of International Dispute Settlement 343, at 352. 
126 Kuijper and Paasivirta (2013), at 60. 
127 Panel Report in EC – Computer Equipment (1998), para. 8.16; Panel Report in EC – IT Products (2010), para. 8.2; 
Panel Report in EC and Certain Member States – Large Civil Aircraft (2011), para 7.174.  
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4.1 A ‘Competence Model’, or a ‘Competence/Remedy Model’? 
 
In comparing the different approaches to EU/MS international responsibility in the WTO and 
under the European Convention on Human Rights, Kuijper aptly qualifies the relative impact 
of the EU’s internal rules on determinations of international responsibility. He argues that it is 
not just internal factors, such as the scope of EU powers and whether the Member States may 
be seen as de facto Union organs in certain instances, which determine the degree to which the 
EU will bear sole or joint responsibility.128 Rather, these internal elements “will be strongly vary 
in impact on the final questions of attribution and responsibility” depending on the specific 
treaty regime in which the responsibility of the EU and/or its Member States is invoked, and 
in particular the prevailing remedy for an internationally wrongful act preferred by the regime 
in question.129 In the context of the WTO, both the legal texts and the practice of the dispute 
settlement organs clearly attach a strong preference for juridical restitution –i.e., the ‘prompt’ 
withdrawal (or modification) of the WTO-inconsistent measure and continued performance of 
WTO obligations. 130  In such a system where the primary consequence of international 
responsibility is the return to legality, the key question becomes who (i.e., the EU or the 
Member States, or both) has the actual power to undo the wrongful act and ensure conformity 
to existing WTO obligations. In this sense, as rightly pointed out by Nollkaemper, the role of 
power in determining international responsibility (whether joint or not) is a fundamental one.131 
Put simply, why would WTO dispute settlement organs bother to assign responsibility to a 
WTO member that does not hold the power to remove (or modify) the measure found WTO-
inconsistent?  
 
That being said, does it necessarily follow that the EU is the one and only able to provide for 
restitution and ensure performance of WTO obligations in all instances? This would seem to 
be the view taken by Kuijper and Paasivirta in suggesting the so-called ‘competence model’ for 
managing EU/MS international responsibility in the WTO. In their opinion, the relevant WTO 
member is the Union and not the Member States: given the near-exclusive EU external 
competence for WTO matters post-Lisbon, only its institutions can provide for the necessary 
restitution and thus the Union should be solely responsible for the WTO-inconsistency of all 
acts taken in the sphere of EU law, including by its Member States.132 But if this proposition is 
accepted, what would be the legal justification for the Member States to remain independent 
members of the WTO, given they are claimed entirely incompetent to fulfill one of the key 
obligations of that membership –i.e., to ensure the conformity of their laws, regulations and 
administrative procedures with WTO obligations133? 
 
In reality, the proposed ‘competence model’ may need some refinement, as evidenced by the 
EU’s own argumentation in the three WTO cases previously discussed in which EU/MS 
                                                        
128 P. J. Kuijper, ‘Attribution – Responsibility – Remedy: Some Comments on the EU in Different International 
Regimes’ (2014) SHARES Research Paper 30, at 20. 
129 Ibid., at 2.  
130 Article 3.7 DSU reads: “[…] In the absence of a mutually agreed solution, the first objective of the dispute 
settlement mechanism is usually to secure the withdrawal of the measures concerned if these are found to be 
inconsistent with the provisions of any of the covered agreements […]” (emphasis added); see also Articles 19.1 
and 21.1 DSU; and van den Bossche (2013), at 194-195 for an overview.    
131 Nollkeamper (2013), at 307-308 and 346.  
132 This ‘competence model’ was first introduced in Kuijper and Paasivirta (2013), at 54-55, and further elaborated 
in Kuijper (2014), at 8-9 and 18. A similar view is taken by Hoffmeister (2010), at 743: “Article 2(1) TEU expresses 
the rule that Member States can no longer act in such exclusive Union policies unless if so empowered by the 
Union. Accordingly, Union law contains a strong indication that in areas of exclusive external Union competence 
action of either the Union institutions or the Member States should be attributed to the Union, as only the Union 
has the legal power to act in this field and to remedy the potential breach of international law.” (emphasis added).  
133 See Article XVI:4 WTO Agreement. 
 22 
responsibility proved contentious in panel proceedings. On the one hand, the two premises 
underlying the ‘competence model’ appear perfectly sensible when applied to situations of 
classical EU executive federalism such as those posed by the EC – Computer Equipment (1998) 
and EC – IT Products (2010) disputes involving EU customs legislation. In both cases, it was 
plainly clear that: first, the EU had required the Member States to act inconsistently with WTO 
law –i.e., by adopting the challenged (directly applicable) regulations that Member States have 
no choice but to apply and which left no room for discretion in terms of implementation; and 
second, the EU was the only entity with the actual power to provide restitution –i.e., to 
modify/withdraw the regulations found WTO-inconsistent. Under these circumstances where 
the Union has full ex-ante and ex-post normative control over Member State action, it would not 
be very efficient nor provide much legal certainty from a third-party perspective, to hold EU 
Member States responsible as they do not have any individual power to undo the wrongful 
situation and ensure performance of WTO obligations.   
  
On the other hand, it is less straightforward whether these two assumptions underpinning the 
‘competence model’ can be upheld as we move away from tariffs and customs matters into 
other areas of WTO law, which are not so extensively regulated at EU level and where the role 
of the EU Member States is not strictly confined to executing EU law. This point is well 
illustrated by the EC – Large Civil Aircraft (2011) dispute. First, it is generally the case that, in 
the field of State aid, the EU does not require but at most authorises Member States to provide 
aid under certain conditions,134 and therefore Member States do enjoy some level of discretion 
in whether or not they act in contravention of the SCM Agreement. Moreover, in this particular 
dispute, the EU did not point to any Commission state aid decision actually authorising the 
separate subsidies granted by the Member States,135 and it has indeed been reported that such 
subsidies were not subject to a specific EU authorisation.136 This being so, it would be hard to 
see how the EU could claim to exercise normative control over Member State subsidising 
action where there appears to be no basis in EU law for assessing the substantive legality of 
such action.137 Indeed, even in an area where the EU has exclusive competence both externally 
and internally,138 it may be possible for Member States to act outside the scope of EU normative 
authority in a manner that violates the SCM Agreement: a key reason for this is that the 
Commission’s control powers are limited to government support that constitutes ‘State aid’, 
which is a narrower concept than the WTO’s notion of ‘subsidy’. 139 Second, in terms of 
                                                        
134 See n 51 above. 
135 See e.g., European Communities — Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, First Written Submission by the 
European Communities, WT/DS316, dated 9 February 2007, at 89-95 providing the factual background to 
MSF/LA arrangements.  
136 See e.g., Kuijper and Paasivirta (2013), at 63; and Delgado (2011), at 206. In this sense, EC – Large Civil Aircraft 
(2011) significantly differs from the EC – Commercial Vessels (2005) dispute, where EU law was clearly at the origin 
of the national aid schemes found WTO-inconsistent and EU sole responsibility was accepted (see section 3.2 
above) 
137 Hoffmeister (2010), at 742, stating that it is necessary to establish that EU law governs the substantive legality 
of Member State action as one of the conditions for determining ‘normative control’ of the Union for the purpose 
of international responsibility. 
138 See Article 3(1)(b) TFEU. 
139 Pursuant to Article 107(1) TFEU, four cumulative conditions have to be met for a Member State’s measure to 
be considered ‘State aid’ and come within the scope of EU rules: (i) there has been an intervention by the State or 
through State resources; (ii) the intervention gives the recipient an advantage on a selective basis; (iii) competition 
has been or may be distorted; (iv) the intervention is likely to affect trade between Member States. Whereas (i) and 
(ii) resemble the WTO criteria of ‘financial contribution by a government/public body conferring a benefit’ 
(Annex 1.1) and ‘specificity’ (Articles 1.2 and 2) for determining the existence of a ‘subsidy’ under the SCM 
Agreement, WTO disciplines are clearly not confined to government support measures that distort competition 
and trade within the EU (i.e., conditions (iii) and (iv) for ‘State aid’), but more broadly apply to subsidies that affect 
international trade (e.g., export and import substitution subsidies prohibited under Article 3 SCM Agreement) and 
cause ‘adverse effects’ to other WTO members (i.e., so-called ‘actionable subsidies’ under Article 5 SCM 
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remedial action, the EU did not attempt to argue that it was best placed to implement the 
Panel’s recommendations. In fact, it is far from evident that the Union alone could have 
remedied the wrongful situation, particularly for those “Member State Financing” (or “Launch 
Aid”) measures that the Panel found to constitute a prohibited (export) subsidy under Article 
3.1(a) SCM Agreement and had to be withdrawn within 90 days.140 Under these circumstances, 
it appears perfectly sensible for the Panel to address individual recommendations to each 
subsidising EU Member State, as they had actual power and full discretion to withdraw their 
WTO-inconsistent subsidies with no need for any prior EU legislative action.  
 
Therefore, the EC – Large Civil Aircraft (2011) dispute highlights that a perfect match between 
EU exclusive external competence for WTO matters and exclusive remedial capacity for any breach of 
WTO law, which underlies the ‘competence model’, cannot simply be taken for granted. The 
question remains, however, whether this may be considered a marginal case due to the 
peculiarities of EU State aid rules, or conversely whether similar doubts as to the EU’s exclusive 
ability to provide restitution could arise in other fields of WTO law. Arguably, this could also 
become an issue in WTO disputes involving acts of the Member States apparently aimed at 
implementing EU Directives, where it can be highly complex, particularly for a third party, to 
identify whether the alleged WTO-inconsistent measure was required by EU law, or instead 
results from an autonomous decision of the Member States, or indeed implicates both. 141  
 
A case in point is the recent complaint brought by Argentina against the EU and some of its 
Member States regarding certain measures affecting the marketing of biodiesel products and 
supporting the biodiesel industry.142 On the one hand, the EU seems clearly responsible for 
GATT/TBT claims against the ‘sustainability criteria’ for biofuels and bioliquids:143 these are 
established as mandatory common standards in the EU Renewable Energy and Fuel Quality 
Directives144 –i.e., only conforming biofuels and bioliquids may count towards meeting the 
obligatory national renewable energy targets set out for each Member States145 and/or be 
                                                        
Agreement). For further discussion, in the specific context of the EC – Large Civil Aircraft (2011) dispute, see M. 
Wu, ‘Why not Brussels? European Community State Aid Rules and the Boeing-Airbus Dispute: Comment on Piet 
Jan Slot’ in K. W. Bagwell, G. A. Bermann and P.C. Mavroidis, Law and Economics of Contingent Protection in 
International Trade (Cambridge University Press, 2010).  
140 Panel Report in EC – Large Civil Aircraft (2011), paras. 8.1 and 8.6, pursuant to Article 4.7 SCM Agreement. 
Note, however, that this finding was reversed by the Appellate Body, as it disagreed with the Panel’s standard for 
determining when a subsidy can be considered as de facto contingent upon anticipated export performance under 
Article 3.1(a) and footnote 4 SCM Agreement: see AB Report in EC – Large Civil Aircraft (2011), paras. 1415-1416. 
141 See e.g., European Union and Certain Member States — Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation Sector, 
Request for Consultations by China, WT/DS452/1, dated 7 November 2012, at 1, whereby China challenges the 
domestic content restrictions in the feed-tariff programmes of Greece and Italy stating that “these measure appear 
to have been promulgated under the powers delegated to EU Member States by, inter alia, Directive 2009/28/EC 
…” 
142 European Union and Certain Member States — Certain Measures on the Importation and Marketing of Biodiesel and Measures 
Supporting the Biodiesel Industry, Request for Consultations by Argentina, WT/DS459/1, dated 23 May 2013. 
143 Ibid., at 1-4. In particular, Argentina objects to the requirement that, in order to be considered ‘sustainable’, 
biofuels and bioliquids must save at least 35% of green house emissions relative to fossil fuels, arguing that this 
threshold is arbitrary and appears neither to be scientifically proven nor based on any international standard. With 
regards to these GATT/TBT claims (PART A), Argentina appears indeed to invoke solely EU responsibility, in 
referring to Article XVI:4 WTO Agreement: “[…] the measures do not appear to conform to the obligation of 
the European Union to ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations and administrative procedures with the 
obligations incumbent upon it under the annexed Agreements.” (emphasis added). This reference is not made 
with respect to GATT/SCM claims in Part B of the consultations request (see n 146 below). 
144 See Directive No 2009/28/EC, Article 17; Directive No 2009/30/EC, Article 7(b).  
145 Directive 2009/28/EC, Article 3 and Annex I, sets out legally binding and differentiated targets for each 
Member States, in order to: (i) increase the share of renewable energy to at least 20% in EU gross final 
consumption of energy by 2020; (ii) increase the share of renewable energy to 10% of energy used in the transport 
sector in each Member States by 2020. For a discussion, see A. Swinbank, EU Support for Biofuels and Bioenergy, 
 24 
eligible for financial support– and therefore only the EU is in a position to modify (or withdraw) 
these criteria if found WTO-inconsistent. On the other hand, it is less obvious whether the 
Union is equally responsible for GATT/SCM claims against tax exemptions/reductions on 
such ‘sustainable’ biofuels allegedly applied by some EU Member States:146 these tax incentives 
are not, strictly speaking, required by EU law147 and therefore Member States retain the power 
to withdraw them if found WTO-inconsistent. In fact, this case raises the type of responsibility 
question that was pragmatically avoided in the EC – Biotech (2006) dispute discussed above and, 
should it reach panel proceedings, may provide a first opportunity for WTO dispute settlement 
organs to actually rule on the question of who is responsible for conduct of the Member States 
that is authorised in EU Directives. 148 
 
In addition, one should bear in mind that there is no strict parallelism between EU exclusive 
external competence in the field of the CCP and the distribution of internal regulatory 
competences between the Union and its Member States.149 To put it differently, even if it is 
accepted that the Union has exclusive treaty-making powers for (nearly) all WTO matters, it does 
not have exclusive treaty-infringing powers. There are some important policy fields covered by 
WTO law that have been only partially regulated at EU level and where Member States retain 
considerable regulatory autonomy internally: one example seen earlier is internal taxation 
(covered by GATT)150 and another patent law (covered by TRIPS).151 In these areas, it could 
well be that an act of a EU Member State outside the scope of EU legislation infringes WTO 
law. If presented with such a scenario, proponents of EU exclusive responsibility may still argue 
                                                        
Environmental Sustainability Criteria, and Trade Policy (International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, 
June 2009), available at: http://www.ictsd.org/downloads/2012/02/eu-support-for-biofuels-and-bioenergy-
environmental-sustainability-criteria-and-trade-policy.pdf.  
146 European Union and Certain Member States — Certain Measures on the Importation and Marketing of Biodiesel and Measures 
Supporting the Biodiesel Industry, Request for Consultations by Argentina, WT/DS459/1, dated 23 May 2013, at 4-7. 
The EU Member States concerned are Belgium and France.  
147 Directive 2003/96/EC, para. 26 of the Preamble and Article 15 allow Member States to exempt or reduce excise 
duties so as to promote the use of biofuels. As such tax exemption/reduction may constitute ‘State aid’, Member 
States are required (Article 26) to notify such measures to, and obtain approval from, the Commission pursuant 
to Article 108 TFEU (see n 51 above). Implementation of such tax incentive schemes varies significantly across 
EU Member States: for an overview, see A. Jung et al., Biofuels – At What Cost? Government Support for Ethanol and 
Biodiesel in the European Union: 2010 Update (International Institute for Sustainable Development, July 2010), at 42-
47, available at: 
https://www.iisd.org/gsi/sites/default/files/bf_eunion_2010update.pdf.  
148 See also, European Union and its Member States — Certain Measures Relating to the Energy Sector, Request for the 
Establishment of a Panel by Russia, WT/DS476/2, dated 28 May 2015, concerning inter alia GATS claims against 
Directive (EC) No 2009/73 and Member State implementing measures, particularly by Croatia, Hungary and 
Lithuania. Here, however, the degree of discretion left to the Member States in implementing the EU Directive 
(i.e., they may select among three alternative ‘unbundling’ models provided for in Article 9 in ensuring the 
separation of natural gas production/supply from transmission networks) does not appear to be the only rationale 
for invoking their responsibility: rather, the alleged claims of violation of Articles XVI and XVII GATS are based 
on the specific commitments that the three EU Member States concerned (presumably) undertook in their 
individual Services Schedules (see n 29 above) with respect to pipeline transport services. 
149 This is reflected in Article 207(6) TFEU, providing that the exercise of EU exclusive competence in the field 
of common commercial policy “shall not affect the delimitation of competences between the Union and the 
Member States, and shall not lead to harmonisation of legislative or regulatory provisions of the Member States 
in so far as the Treaties exclude such harmonisation.” 
150 Article 113 TFEU provides the legal basis for the harmonisation of national legislations for certain forms of 
taxation (e.g., turnover taxes, excise duties and other forms of indirect taxation), but only “to the extent that such 
harmonisation is necessary to ensure the establishment and the functioning of the internal market and to avoid 
distortion of competition.” On this point, see Eeckhout (2006), at 10.  
151 Article 118 TFEU provides the legal basis for the creation of European intellectual property rights and for the 
setting up of centralised Union-wide authorisation, coordination and supervision arrangements. One of the few 
pieces of EU legislation in the field of patent law: Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 6 July 1998 on the legal protection of biotechnological inventions [1998] OJ L213/13.  
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that the Union has internal control mechanisms to effectively ensure compliance with an 
adverse WTO ruling,152 notably by initiating infringement proceedings against the Member 
State(s) concerned.153 However, from the perspective of the WTO dispute settlement organs, 
why would this be any more effective than holding the infringing EU Member State directly 
responsible?  
 
To sum up, when approaching EU/MS responsibility for breaches of WTO law, the key 
practical question is who has the actual power to provide juridical restitution and secure 
performance of WTO obligations, as underscored by the ‘competence/remedy’ model suggested 
here. From this angle, the internal distribution of competences becomes a relevant criterion for 
the purposes of attributing EU/MS international responsibility: complaining parties would 
generally address their claims,154 and WTO dispute settlement organs their findings, based on 
their assessment of who is in the best position to withdraw or amend the WTO-inconsistent 
measure.155 However, and importantly, it does not follow that the EU –and not its Member 
States– is the relevant WTO member in each and every case just because it has exclusive external 
competence for WTO matters. As we have seen, it is not a foregone conclusion that EU 
Member States have no role to play in ensuring conformity of their laws, regulations and 
administrative practices with WTO law, and particularly as we move away from highly 
integrated areas of the CCP. So as long as they remain independent members of the WTO, EU 
Member States can be targeted as respondents and incur responsibility for their WTO-
infringing conduct, particularly where they retain an actual power to undo the wrongful 
situation –i.e., because EU normative control over their action is either limited or absent 
altogether. That being so, there appears to be no compelling grounds why WTO dispute 
settlement organs should instead rely on the Commission’s infringement action or other 
internal enforcement mechanisms so as to ensure due performance by the Member States of 
their WTO obligations. 
 
4.2 A Case Apart?  
 
The aforementioned ‘competence/remedy’ model to EU/MS international responsibility in the 
WTO inevitably raises the question as to whether the internal division of powers between the 
Union and its Member States may matter less for determinations of international responsibility 
in other treaty regimes which, unlike the WTO dispute settlement system, do not favour 
juridical restitution as the primary remedy for breaches. This proposition is, indeed, supported 
by the approach taken to the apportionment of responsibility between the EU and its Member 
States in the context of Investor-State dispute settlement (ISDS) proceedings, where the most 
common remedy is monetary compensation.156 Thus, in this treaty context, the key question is 
                                                        
152 See Kuijper and Paasivirta (2013), at 39 and 59. 
153 Articles 258 and 260 TFEU; and C – 239/03 Commission v France (Étang de Berre) [2004] ECR I-9325, para. 29 
(concerning also a ‘mixed’ agreement). Pursuant to Article 216(2) TFEU, the WTO covered agreements are also 
binding upon the EU Member States as a matter of EU law, and thus they are under an obligation in EU law to 
adopt the necessary measures to implement WTO obligations, and refrain from taking any measure that would 
undermine due performance of such obligations. See generally, M. Mendez, ‘The Enforcement of EU Agreements: 
Bolstering the Effectiveness of Treaty Law?’ (2010) 47(6) Common Market Law Review 1719.  
154 However, see Delgado Casteleiro and Larik (2013), at 253 rightly noting that complaining parties in the WTO 
may strategically target the EU as a respondent, rather than individual Member States, fostered by the prospects 
of being capable to retaliate (i.e., ‘suspension of concessions or other obligations’ as one of the temporary remedies 
provided for in Article 3.7 and 22.2 DSU) against the Union as a whole in their quest to induce compliance. Yet 
arguably, this possibility of retaliating against the Union as a whole is not impaired by bringing joint complaints 
again the EU and (some of) its Member States.   
155 For a similar view, in the context of non-compliance proceedings under multilateral environmental agreements, 
see Nollkaemper (2013), at 343 and 346. 
156 See e.g., R. Dolzer and C. Shreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (OUP, 2nd edition, 2012), at 296-297. 
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most often who should pay monetary damages awarded by arbitral tribunals, and not so much 
who holds the power to undo a wrongful act.157 As exposed below, even though foreign direct 
investment (FDI) is also in an area of exclusive EU external competence,158 the Union seems 
here less eager to assume exclusive responsibility at all costs.  
 
The reasons for this are spelled out in the recently adopted EU Regulation establishing a 
framework for managing financial responsibility linked to State-investor dispute settlement,159 
but are somehow contradictory. On the one hand, the Regulation reaffirms the view that 
international responsibility should follow the internal division of powers: given that the EU is 
exclusively competent to assume international obligations in the field of FDI, only the EU can 
in principle act as a respondent and be held internationally responsible for violations of FDI 
provisions, “irrespective of whether the treatment at issue is afforded by the Union itself or by 
a Member State.”160 On the other hand, the Regulation seeks to distinguish between this external 
responsibility under public international law and the allocation of financial responsibility as an 
internal EU law matter, decided irrespective of international responsibility:  
“Where the Union … has international responsibility for the treatment afforded, it will 
be expected, as a matter of international law, to pay any adverse award and bear the 
costs of any dispute. However, an adverse award may potentially flow either from 
treatment afforded by the Union itself or from treatment afforded by a Member State. 
It would as a consequence be inequitable if awards and the costs of arbitration were to 
be paid from the budget of the Union where the treatment was afforded by a Member 
State, unless the treatment in question is required by Union law. It is therefore necessary 
that financial responsibility be allocated, as a matter of Union law, between the Union 
itself and the Member State responsible for the treatment afforded on the basis of 
criteria established by this Regulation.”161 
 
                                                        
157 While arbitral tribunals do in principle have the power to award restitution (unless excluded in a given 
investment treaty), it has seldom been requested and awarded in practice. On the reasons for this, see S. Ripinsky 
and K. Williams, Damages in International Investment Law (British Institute of International and Comparative Law, 
2008), at 57-59. 
158 Following the entry into force of the Lisbon treaty, foreign direct investment is now included within the CCP 
under Article 207(1) TFEU. On this new competence, see inter alia J.A. Bischoff, ‘Just a little BIT of “mixity”? 
The EU’s role in the field of international investment protection law' (2011) 48(5) Common Market Law Review 1527; 
J. Chaisse, ‘Promises and Pitfalls of the European Union Policy on Foreign Investment – How Will the New EU 
Competence on FDI Affect the Emerging Global Regime’ (2012) 15(1) Journal of International Economic Law 51; A. 
Dimopoulos, ‘Creating an EU Investment Policy: Challenges for the Post-Lisbon Era of External Relations’ in 
P.J. Cardwell (ed.), EU External Relations Law and Policy in the Post-Lisbon Era (Asser Press, 2012); A.R. Ziegler, ‘The 
New Competence of the European Union in the Area of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI): A Third Country 
Perspective’ in M. Bungenberg and C. Herrmann (eds), European Yearbook of International Economic Law – Common 
Commercial Policy After Lisbon (Springer, special issue, 2013). 
159 Regulation (EU) No 912/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 establishing a 
framework for managing financial responsibility linked to investor-to-state dispute settlement tribunals established 
by international agreements to which the European Union is party [2014] OJ L257/121 [hereinafter, EU 
Regulation No 912/2014].  
160 Regulation (EU) No 912/2014, paragraph 3 of the Preamble. See also, European Commission, ‘Proposal for a 
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a framework for managing financial 
responsibility linked to investor-state dispute settlement tribunals established by international agreements to which 
the European Union is party’ (COM (2012) 335 final), dated 21 June 2012, at 4 stating that: “Should it be the case 
that both the European Union and the Member States are parties to an agreement and it needs to be decided who 
is responsible as a matter of international law for any particular action, the Commission takes the view that this has to 
be decided not by the author of the act, but on the basis of the competence for the subject matter of the international rules in question, 
as set down in the Treaty. In this perspective, it is immaterial that a Member State has competence under the rules on the 
internal market allowing it to legislate in its domestic sphere.” (emphasis added). 
161 Regulation (EU) No 912/2014, paragraph 5 of the Preamble. 
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It is questionable whether such a distinction is convincing, among others because the EU 
Regulation directly links the internal allocation of financial responsibility with respondent status 
in ISDS proceedings. As a general rule,162 participation in arbitral proceedings follows the 
division of financial responsibility, whereby the EU should act as sole respondent where the 
dispute: (i) involves (exclusively or also) treatment afforded by its institutions; or (ii) involves 
treatment afforded by the EU Member States insofar as the treatment concerned “is required 
by Union law”. 163  Unless this is so, EU Member States should act as the respondent in 
investment disputes concerning treatment afforded by their own organs. 164  In case of an 
adverse ruling, EU Member States would not only bear financial responsibility under EU law, 
but also and importantly under international law –i.e., an international law obligation to pay 
damages awarded by the arbitral tribunal in question.165  
 
It follows therefore that, in the context of ISDS, the Union is only ready to take up international 
responsibility for acts of its Member States to the extent that such conduct is required by EU law. 
While this criterion is not crystal-clear and may not always be easy to apply in practice,166 
‘required by Union law’ does narrow the scope of EU sole responsibility for the acts of its 
Member States in the investment context. Arguably, it does not encompass all instances in which 
EU Member States act in the execution of EU legislation, but this will depend on the level of 
discretion left to them in terms of implementation.167 In other words, emphasis here is not so 
much on who is competent for contracting the international investment obligation in question, 
but rather on whether a provision in EU law is actually at the origin of the breach. Whereas 
this more cautious approach in asserting EU exclusive responsibility vis-à-vis that taken in the 
                                                        
162 Regulation (EU) No 912/2014, Article 9 provides exceptions to this general rule, whereby the EU will act as 
the respondent independently of where financial responsibility lies, notably: (i) where similar treatment is being 
challenged in a related claim against the Union in the WTO, provided that a WTO panel has been established and 
the claim concerns the same specific legal issue and it is necessary to ensure consistent argumentation in the WTO 
(Article 9(3)); and (ii) where EU Member States decline to act as respondents, even though financial responsibility 
lies with them (Article 9(1)(b)).  
163 Regulation (EU) No 912/2014, paragraphs 7-9 of the Preamble; Article 3(1)(a) and (c); Article 4(1); Article 9 
(2).  
164 Regulation (EU) No 912/2014, Article 9(1). Therefore, the Regulations seeks to eliminate the possibility of 
bringing a claim simultaneously against both the EU and the Member States: see further, F. Baetens, G. Kreijen 
and A. Varga, ‘Determining International Responsibility under the New Extra-EU Investment Agreements: What 
Foreign Investors in the EU Should Know’ (2014) 47(5) Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 1203, at 1225-1227. 
This ‘either/or’ approach has also been incorporated in the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade 
Agreement, Article X.20, which provides a procedural mechanism for the determination of respondent status in 
disputes with the EU or its Member States. In essence, the EU is under an obligation to inform the investor 
concerned as to whether the Union or a Member State shall be the respondent and thus discharge international 
responsibility. If it fails to do so within 50 days, responsibility will be divided as follows: (i) where the measures 
identified by the investor are exclusively measures of a Member State, that Member State shall be the respondent; 
(ii) where the measures identified by the investor include measures of the EU, the Union shall be respondent.  
165  A. Dimopoulos, ‘The Involvement of the EU in Investor-State Dispute Settlement: A Question of 
Responsibilities’ (2014) 51 Common Market Law Review 1671, at 1677-1678.  
166 See on this point, C. Tiejte, E. Sipiorsk and G. Topfër, Responsibility in Investor – State Arbitration in the EU 
(European Parliament, 2012), at 18-19, available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2012/457126/EXPO-
INTA_ET%282012%29457126_EN.pdf. 
167 See notably, Regulation (EU) No 912/2014, paragraph 7 of the Preamble, qualifying this criterion in the context 
of EU Directives: “… where the Member State acts in a manner required by Union law, for example in transposing 
a directive adopted by the Union, the Union itself should bear financial responsibility in so far as the treatment 
concerned is required by Union law.” (emphasis added). For a seemingly more flexible reading as incorporating all 
instances in which EU Member States act to implement EU law, see A. Delgado Casteleiro, ‘The International 
Responsibility of the European Union – The EU Perspective: Between Pragmatism and Proceduralisation’ (2012-
2013) 15 Cambridge Journal of European Legal Studies 563, at 580-581 (referring to the “EU’s normative control”) and 
586 (referring to “implementing EU law”).  
 28 
WTO may be explained by moral hazard concerns,168 it is nonetheless at odds with the Union’s 
own argument that the scope of EU exclusive external powers should be the decisive factor for 
assigning EU/MS responsibility under mixed agreements.169  
 
5)  CONCLUSIONS  
 
It is largely undisputed that the European Union has played a prominent role in the WTO 
dispute settlement system over the past two decades. As one of the rare international fora where 
the EU is actually allowed to fully participate in dispute settlement proceedings, it is not 
surprising that the Union has been eager to stand as a ‘responsible’ –if not ‘over-responsible’– 
actor in the multilateral trading system, even if not always compliant with WTO law. And yet, 
this ‘success story’ should not lead us to overstate neither the degree to which third parties have 
accepted the EU’s eagerness to assume exclusive responsibility for breaches of WTO law by its 
Member States, nor the relative impact of its own competence rules on determinations of 
EU/MS international responsibility in the WTO. The main reason calling for a more qualified 
assessment is that we simply do not have (as of yet) well-established authoritative WTO 
jurisprudence on the sensitive question of when can Member State conduct be attributed to the 
Union: 170 as we have seen, it has been raised and adjudicated only on three occasions in WTO 
panel proceedings and never thus far in Appellate Body proceedings. In addition, WTO dispute 
settlement practice reveals that joint complaints against the EU and its Member States have not 
ceased, even if the Union has been granted exclusive external powers for almost all WTO 
matters under the Lisbon Treaty.  
Nonetheless, in the three cases where EU/MS responsibility was contentious, WTO panels 
have unambiguously held that EU Member States are bound to perform all obligations 
incumbent upon them under the WTO Agreement (and its annexed agreements), so as long as 
they remain full and independent members of the WTO and irrespective of the (exclusive) powers 
they may have transferred to the Union in the CCP field under EU law. While this stance may 
grate on the ears of most EU lawyers, it is legally sound from an international law standpoint. 
Moreover, it also wise from a broader governance perspective: to put it bluntly, it is not for 
WTO dispute settlement organs to turn the WTO Agreement de facto into a ‘pure’ EU 
agreement for the purpose of international responsibility. 171  That being so, in assigning 
international responsibility –i.e., whether solely to the EU (EC – Computer Equipment (1998) and 
EC – IT Products (2010)) or jointly with (some of) its Member States (EC – Large Civil Aircraft 
(2011)), these WTO panels were seemingly guided by one pragmatic consideration: who has 
the actual power to remove (or modify) the measure found WTO-inconsistent? Therefore, it is 
this special feature of the WTO dispute settlement system –i.e., a clear preference for juridical 
restitution as a primary remedy for breaches of WTO law– that ultimately renders the internal 
division of competences between the EU and the Member States a relevant criterion in deciding 
                                                        
168 See Dimopoulos (2014), at 1676, noting that, unlike in the WTO dispute settlement system (where the primary 
remedy is not compensation), the assumption by the EU of international responsibility for all Member State acts 
violating investment obligations raises very significant moral hazard concerns: “Member States may act in violation 
of their obligations under EU [international investment agreements], knowing that compensation will be paid by 
the EU and (indirectly) shared by all Member States.” Arguably, similar moral hazard concerns could arise with 
regards to retaliation in the WTO dispute settlement system, albeit this is only a secondary remedy therein (see n 
154 above). 
169 See section 2.2 above.  
170 See section 3.4 above, indicating that the vast majority of the total 68 WTO disputes in which the EU was 
targeted as sole respondent concerned EU measures only –and not Member States measures as such– and 
therefore there was no ambiguity that such EU acts were attributable to the Union.  
171 In a post-Lisbon setting, this would have likely been the practical consequence had WTO dispute settlement 
organs accepted the Commission’s proposition (supported by some EU law scholars) that the apportionment of 
obligations should strictly follow the distribution of external competences under EU law and be the decisive factor 
in assigning international responsibility (see section 2.2 above) 
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who should be held responsible. This ‘competence/remedy’ model for managing EU/MS 
international responsibility in the WTO may thus remain a case apart, unique to that dispute 
settlement regime, as notably demonstrated by the more cautious EU approach emerging in 
the investment field.   
 
However, and contrary to what other scholars appear to suggest, 172  it is not a foregone 
conclusion that the EU is always the one and only entity with the actual power to provide 
juridical restitution in the WTO dispute settlement system, just because it has exclusive external 
competence for nearly all WTO matters. This is undoubtedly the case when it comes to highly 
harmonised segments of the CCP (e.g., tariffs and customs matters), where Member States 
conduct is strictly confined to implementing directly applicable EU legislation: evidently, the 
EU only can amend/withdraw such legislation if found WTO-inconsistent. And yet, as we have 
seen, it is less straightforward why the EU would also have such an exclusive remedial capacity 
for breaches of WTO law in cases where its normative control over Member State action is 
more limited, or indeed entirely absent: for instance, why couldn’t the EU Member States 
themselves withdraw their own subsidies, or regulatory measures permitted but not required 
by EU law, if found WTO-inconsistent? In fact, from the perspective of providing juridical 
restitution, it is not the division of external (i.e., treaty-making) competences between EU and 
Member States that is of primordial importance but of internal (treaty-infringing/treaty-
performing) competences –and importantly, the latter are not within the exclusive regulatory 
domain of the Union for all subject matters covered by WTO law.173 This being so, insofar as 
EU Member States are targeted as a respondent in a WTO dispute and hold the power to end 
an eventual breach of their WTO obligations, there is no cogent reasons why WTO dispute 
settlement organs should rely on EU control mechanisms174 instead of direct responsibility and 
accountability under WTO law. Indeed, this would not only make little sense from an 
international law perspective, but also be undesirable for intra-EU ‘fairness’ considerations. To 
retake the logic underpinning the EU Regulation on financial responsibility in the ISDS 
context, 175  why would it be any more ‘fair’ in the WTO for the EU alone to face the 
consequences of international responsibility (including possible retaliation) en bloc, when a 
breach of WTO law is caused by the discretionary (i.e., where EU law merely authorises) or 
fully autonomous (i.e., where there is no EU legislation) decision of one (or some) of its 
Member States?  
 
In closing, it is important to underline that the issue of EU/MS international responsibility in 
the WTO is not, of course, a purely legal question but one highly political for all players 
involved. For the EU, the capacity to speak with one voice and assert its exclusive responsibility 
in the WTO dispute settlement system is certainly instrumental in forging its own identity as a 
leading trade actor and power on the global stage,176 but also important at a more practical 
level.177 At the same time, it appears politically unviable for (some) EU Member States to even 
                                                        
172 See note 132 above. 
173 See sections 2.3 and 4.1 above, pointing to several policy areas covered by WTO law where there has been (as 
of yet) no full harmonisation of national laws, because they have been only partially regulated at EU level (e.g., 
minimum standard Directives in the areas of consumer and environmental protection), or even not at all (e.g., 
certain forms of internal taxation). 
174 Again, doing so would de facto turn the WTO Agreement into a ‘pure’ EU agreement, whereby EU Member 
States are not seen as WTO members in their own right and bearers of the contractual obligations, but mere 
vehicles for carrying out the EU’s obligations under WTO law.   
175 Regulation (EU) No 912/2014, paragraph 5 of the Preamble, discussed in section 4.2 above. 
176 See inter alia, Baetens, Kreijen and Varga (2014), at 1244; Delgado Casteleiro and Larik (2013), at 255. 
177  See Kuijper (2010), at 224, arguing that “[f]or practical reasons, there can be no question of drafting 
submissions to WTO Panels and Appellate Body in a commission consisting of the Commission and all the 
Member States: it would be the death of any coherent application or defence before these jurisdictional organs.” 
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consider relinquishing their independent membership of the WTO.178 For their part, other 
WTO members may target the EU and its Member States jointly as respondents not solely out 
of genuine legal concerns,179 but strategically as a means to challenge the Union’s unity and 
leadership in the WTO. 180  In these circumstances, the EU and its Member States may 
increasingly find themselves at a crossroad between maintaining their ‘joint’ membership of the 
WTO while claiming the EU’s ‘exclusive’ responsibility in its dispute settlement system. Indeed, 
aside from voting and other political considerations,181 one may well question whether there is 
still a legal need, as a matter of EU law,182 for the parallel EU/MS membership of the WTO. 
In other words, have EU exclusive powers under the CCP now become sufficiently broad for 
the Union to assume alone the obligations of WTO membership?183 And if so, does the EU 
have effective internal mechanisms at its disposal to ensure implementation of those obligations 
by its Member States?184 It is not the purpose of the present chapter to engage with these 
convoluted questions of EU law, nor to take a position on the highly controversial and 
politically sensitive issue of whether the Member States should remain WTO members in their 
own right.185 What is here submitted is that it is for the EU and its Member States to address 
these matters in-house, and meanwhile the WTO dispute settlement organs have made a 
judicious choice not to interfere.  
 
 
                                                        
178 See e.g., see M. Hanh and L. Danieli, ‘You’ll Never Walk Alone: the European Union and its Member States 
in the WTO’ in M. Bungenberg and C. Herrmann (eds.), European Yearbook of International Economic Law – Common 
Commercial Policy After Lisbon (Springer, special issue, 2013), at 63 arguing that it could even cause “a constitutional 
crisis” in some EU Member States (e.g., Germany if the Lisbon Treaty was interpreted as requiring their withdrawal 
from the WTO.   
179 Arguably, the EC – Large Civil Aircraft (2011) case could be cited as an example here. 
180 Arguably, the EC – Computer Equipment (1998) and EC – IT Products (2010) cases could be seen as an example 
of the US ‘divide and rule’ strategy: see Billiet (2005), at 199. 
181 Pursuant to Article IX(1) WTO Agreement, the EU does not just have one vote in WTO decision-making but 
a number of votes equal to the number of its Member States (i.e., 28 at present). In reality, this ‘greater voting 
power’ has thus far been of limited value given to the consensus-based WTO decision-making practice. However, 
the WTO Agreement does provide for the possibility to resort to voting and, from this perspective, the EU may 
not want to give up its current advantage should WTO decision-making practice move away from consensus in 
the future. On this point, see M. Bungenberg, ‘Going Global? The EU Common Commercial Policy after Lisbon’ 
in C. Herrmann and J.P. Terhechte (eds.), European Yearbook of International Economic Law (Springer, 2010), at 134-
135; Hanh and Danieli (2013), at 53-54. 
182 In principle, from a WTO law perspective, any member may unilaterally withdraw from the WTO, six months 
after the written notice of withdrawal is received by the Director-General (Article XV(1) WTO Agreement).  
183 From an EU law perspective, besides the exclusion of transport services from the scope of the CCP (see n 24 
above), EU Member States seem to attach particular significance to the fact that they (not the EU) contribute to 
the WTO budget to justify their continued participation in the organisation: see e.g., WTO Trade Policy Review 
Body, ‘Trade Policy Review – Report by the European Union’ (WT/TPR/G/248), dated 1 June 2011, at 6 
(footnote 2) noting that “Member States maintain an active role in the Committee on Budget, Finance and 
Administration” after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. However, see Opinion 1/94, para. 21, where the 
Court already opined: “Given that the WTO is an international organization which will have only an operating 
budget and not a financial policy instrument, the fact that the Member States will bear some of its expenses cannot, 
on any view, of itself justify participation of the Member States in the conclusion of the WTO Agreement.” 
184 On this point, see n 155 above. 
185 In favour of preserving the status quo, see e.g., Hanh and Danieli (2013), at 61-63. For a seemingly different 
view, see among others, Bungenberg (2010), at 134.  
